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作者：Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Wurzburg
摘要：We investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product-specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable retail services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consumer prices and can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even reducing, the overall level of retail services. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, mini...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; Lee, Frances Xu; Suen, Wing
作者单位：Columbia University; Loyola University Chicago; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study a persuasion game in which biased-possibly opposed-experts strategically acquire costly information that they can then conceal or reveal. We show that information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes when experts have linear preferences over a decision maker's beliefs. The logic turns on how each expert expects the decision maker's posterior to be affected by the presence of other experts should he not acquire information that would turn out to be favorable. The decision ma...
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作者：Chi, Chang-Koo; Choi, Kyoung Jin
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH); Aalto University; University of Calgary
摘要：Recent studies conclude that small firms have higher but more variable growth rates than large firms. To explore how this empirical regularity affects moral hazard and investment, we develop an agency model with a firm size process having two features: the drift is controlled by the agent's effort and the principal's investment decision, and the volatility is proportional to the square root of size. The firm improves on production efficiency as it grows, and wages are back- loaded when size is...
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作者：Mak, Henry Y.
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
摘要：A provider's performance report consists of his service average outcome and volume. The two variables depend on the provider's private quality type and current demand, but he can raise his average outcome by dumping vulnerable consumers. Prospective consumers infer providers' qualities from their reports. Performance reporting drives some providers to dump consumers when competition is intense, but it may not reveal providers' qualities when their average quality is high. Statistical adjustmen...
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作者：Kalnins, Arturs; Froeb, Luke; Tschantz, Steven
作者单位：Cornell University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We find that hotel mergers increase occupancy. In some specifications, price also rises. Because these effects occur only in markets with high capacity utilization and high uncertainty, we reject simple models of price or quantity competition in favor of models of revenue management, where firms price to fill available capacity in the face of uncertain demand.
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作者：Miller, Nathan H.; Osborne, Matthew; Sheu, Gloria
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Toronto
摘要：We estimate pass-through with 30 years of data from the portland cement industry. Robust econometric evidence supports that fuel cost changes are more than fully transmitted downstream in the form of price changes. This validates an implicit pass-through assumption made in recent academic research and regulatory analyses. We combine the econometric results with estimates of competitive conduct obtained from the literature to evaluate the incidence of market-based CO2 regulation. Producers bear...
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作者：Obara, Ichiro; Zincenko, Federico
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We examine the impact of heterogeneous discounting on collusion in dynamic Bertrand competition. We show exactly when collusion can be sustained and how collusion would be organized efficiently with heterogeneous discounting. First, we show that collusion is possible if and only if the average discount factor exceeds a certain threshold, with or without capacity constraints. Next, we identify a dynamic pattern of market share that characterizes efficient collusion and obtain the unique long-ru...
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作者：Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose; Sandor, Zsolt; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Groningen; Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We study price formation in a model of consumer search for differentiated products in which consumers have heterogeneous search costs. We provide conditions under which a pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. Search costs affect two margins-the intensive search margin (or search intensity) and the extensive search margin (or the decision to search rather than to not search at all). These two margins affect the elasticity of demand in opposite directions and whether low...
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作者：Shan, Yaping
作者单位：University of Adelaide
摘要：We study the agency problem between a firm and its research employees under several scenarios characterized by different Research and Development (R&D) unit setups. In a multiagent dynamic contracting setting, we describe the precise pattern of the optimal contract. We illustrate that the optimal incentive regime is a function of how agents' efforts interact with one another: relative performance evaluation is used when their efforts are substitutes, whereas joint performance evaluation is use...
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作者：Campbell, Arthur; Mayzlin, Dina; Shin, Jiwoong
作者单位：Monash University; University of Southern California; Yale University
摘要：We model the incentives of individuals to engage in word of mouth (or buzz) about a product, and how a firm may strategically influence this process through its information release and advertising strategies. Individuals receive utility by improving how others perceive them. A firm restricts access to information, advertising may crowd out word of mouth, and a credible commitment not to engage in advertising is valuable for a firm.
