作者：Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：I study optimal contracting where the principal can verify the agent's private information via auditing but cannot contractually commit to audit frequency. Optimal contracting requires sophisticated communication: the agent reports his information to a mediator, who randomly selects a contract. Mediation allows for fine-tuning the information flow, because the principal observes the selected contract but not the agent's report. Simply offering a menu of contracts is, in general, not optimal. I...
作者：Toxvaerd, Flavio
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：I study a multiperiod model of limit pricing under one-sided incomplete information. I characterize pooling and separating equilibria and their existence and determine when these involve limit pricing. For some parameter constellations, the unique equilibrium surviving a D1 type refinement involves immediate separation on monopoly prices. For others, there are limit price equilibria surviving the refinement in which different types may initially pool and then (possibly) separate. Separation in...
