Agenda chasing and contests among news providers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Katona, Zsolt; Knee, Jonathan A.; Sarvary, Miklos
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12191
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 783-809
• 关键词: competition

摘要

This article studies competition in contests with a focus on the news industry that is increasingly influenced by social media. The model assumes publishers to pick a single topic from a large pool based on the topics' prior success probabilities, thereby chasing potentially successful topics. Firms that publish topics that become successful divide a reward which can change with the number of competing firms and the number of successful topics. The results show that share structures can be categorized into three types that, in turn, lead to qualitatively different outcomes for the contest.