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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Lefouili, Yassine
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross-licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross-licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross-licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the l...
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作者：Liu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; National University of Singapore
摘要：This article studies cost-minimizing two-stage procurement with Research and Development (R&D). The principal wishes to procure a product from an agent. At the first stage, the agent can conduct R&D to discover a more cost-efficient production technology. First-stage R&D efficiency and effort and the realized second-stage production cost are the agent's private information. The optimal two-stage mechanism is implemented by a menu of single-stage contracts, each specifying a fixed provision pri...
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作者：Takahashi, Hidenori
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：I investigate firms' competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of Design-Build (DB) auctions. Reviewers' design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder's perspective, leading luck to dampen differences in the firms' chances of winning. I model bidders' behavior and show semiparametric identification of the model primitives. Uncertain design evaluations increase the expected price of design quality and exacerbate an auctioneer's uncertaint...
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作者：de Roos, Nicolas
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：We examine the effect of limited product comparability on the viability of collusion. Firms choose messages to influence consumer product comparison. The cartel hinders transparency on the equilibrium path and seeks it for optimal punishment. Five conditions are each sufficient to ensure obfuscation aids collusion: if firms can mix over messages or commit to messages, if messages are informative, or if an individual firm or the cartel can control comparability. We also analyze the impact of me...
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作者：Luo, Yao; Perrigne, Isabelle; Quang Vuong
作者单位：University of Toronto; Rice University; New York University
摘要：Uncertainty about ex post realized values is an inherent component in many auction environments. In this article, we develop a structural framework to analyze auction data subject to ex post uncertainty as a pure risk. We consider a low-price sealed-bid auction model with heterogeneous bidders' preferences and ex post uncertainty. The uncertainty can be common to all bidders or idiosyncratic. We derive the model restrictions and study nonparametric and semiparametric identification of the mode...
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作者：Chen, Ying-Ju; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Monash University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study pricing strategies of competing firms selling heterogeneous products to consumers. Goods are substitutes and there are network externalities between neighboring consumers. In equilibrium, firms price discriminate based on the network positions and charge lower prices to more central consumers. We also show that, under some conditions, firms' equilibrium profits decrease when either the network becomes denser or network effects increase. In contrast, consumers always benefit from being...
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.; Myatt, David P.
作者单位：Cornell University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study product line choice allowing for cost asymmetries but ruling out strategic motivations such as a desire to soften competition. We identify two forces that interact with asymmetric competition to shape equilibrium product lines. Possible outcomes range from head-to-head competition to complete separation of product lines and include the intermediate case of partial separation. In an international trade context, we predict which qualities a disadvantaged foreign producer will specialize...
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作者：Miravete, Eugenio J.; Moral, Maria J.; Thurk, Jeff
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED); University of Notre Dame
摘要：Economic integration agreements have significantly decreased import tariffs. We investigate whether national policies can be an effective replacement for tariffs to protect domestic industry. We show that (a) European fuel taxes and vehicle emissions policy favored diesel vehicles, a technology popular with European consumers but largely offered only by domestic automakers; (b) European automakers benefited from pro-diesel fuel taxes and a lenient NOx emissions policy to earn significant profi...
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作者：Fang, Hanming; Wu, Zenan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Peking University
摘要：We investigate whether selection based on multidimensional private information in risks and risk preferences can, under different market structures, result in a negative correlation between insurance coverage and expost realization of risk. We show that, under perfect competition, selection based on multidimensional private information does not result in the negative correlation property, unless there is a sufficiently high loading factor. However, it is possible to generate the negative corre...
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作者：Petrakis, Emmanuel; Tsakas, Nikolas
作者单位：University of Crete; University of Cyprus
摘要：We investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of R&D networks considering farsighted firms. The presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbents to collaborate. Incumbent firms may form an otherwise undesirable collaboration to deter entry of a new firm. Moreover, an incumbent may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable collaboration, expecting to form a more profitable link with the entrant. Finally, potential entry may lead an i...
