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作者：Chao, Yong; Tan, Guofu; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
作者单位：University of Louisville; University of Southern California; Lingnan University
摘要：We investigate the strategic effects of all-units discounts (AUDs) used by a dominant firm in the presence of a capacity-constrained rival. Due to the limited capacity of the rival, the dominant firm has a captive portion of the buyer's demand for the single product. As compared to linear pricing, the dominant firm can use AUDs to go beyond its captive portion by tying its captive demand with part of the competitive demand and partially foreclose its small rival. When the rival's capacity leve...
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作者：Martimort, David; Pouyet, Jerome; Ricci, Francesco
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CY Cergy Paris Universite; ESSEC Business School; Universite de Montpellier
摘要：A concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. A virtual Hotelling rule describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along the optimal extraction path. Fields which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow different extraction paths. Resource might be left unexploited in the long run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties ...
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作者：Dana, James D., Jr.; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：Northeastern University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：With imperfect private monitoring, a firm selling two experience goods can increase both producer and consumer surplus by bundling. Bundling constrains consumers to buy two products, making consumers better informed and ensuring that they use tougher punishment strategies. Both increased monitoring and increased punishment benefit other consumers, so bundling overcomes a free-rider problem. The social value of bundling is even larger if consumers cannot attribute a negative signal to the speci...
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作者：Garcia, Daniel; Shelegia, Sandro
作者单位：University of Vienna; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This article studies observational learning in a consumer search environment. Consumers observe the purchasing decision of a predecessor with similar preferences. Consumers rationally emulate by initiating their search at the firm from which their predecessor purchased, free-riding on search effort, and reacting less to price changes. Prices are nonmonotone in search costs and may be as low as marginal costs. We discuss several extensions and show that the effect of emulation on prices is stro...
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作者：Ederer, Florian; Holden, Richard; Meyer, Margaret
作者单位：Yale University; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Oxford; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study the benefits and costs of opacity (deliberate lack of transparency) of incentive schemes as a strategy to combat gaming by better informed agents. In a two-task moral hazard model in which only the agent knows which task is less costly, the agent has an incentive to focus his effort on the less costly task. Opaque schemes, which make a risk-averse agent uncertain about which task will be more highly rewarded, mitigate such gaming but impose more risk. We identify environments in which...
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作者：Besanko, David; Tong, Jian; Wu, Jason Jianjun
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Southampton
摘要：We study subsidy policies for research programs when firms have private information about the likelihood of project viability, but the government cannot form a unique prior about this likelihood. When the shadow cost of public funds is zero, first-best welfare can be attained as a (belief-free) ex post equilibrium under both monopoly and competition, but it cannot be attained when the shadow cost is positive. However, max-min subsidy policies exist under monopoly and competition and consist of...
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作者：Gross, Daniel P.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Although tractors are now used in nearly every agricultural field operation and in the production of nearly all crops, they first developed with much more limited application. Early diffusion was accordingly rapid in these narrower applications but limited in scope until tractor technology generalized. The sequence of diffusion is consistent with a model of Research and Development (R&D) in specific- versus general-purpose attributes and with other historical examples, suggesting that the key ...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Lefouili, Yassine
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross-licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross-licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross-licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross-licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the l...
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作者：Liu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; National University of Singapore
摘要：This article studies cost-minimizing two-stage procurement with Research and Development (R&D). The principal wishes to procure a product from an agent. At the first stage, the agent can conduct R&D to discover a more cost-efficient production technology. First-stage R&D efficiency and effort and the realized second-stage production cost are the agent's private information. The optimal two-stage mechanism is implemented by a menu of single-stage contracts, each specifying a fixed provision pri...
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作者：Takahashi, Hidenori
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：I investigate firms' competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of Design-Build (DB) auctions. Reviewers' design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder's perspective, leading luck to dampen differences in the firms' chances of winning. I model bidders' behavior and show semiparametric identification of the model primitives. Uncertain design evaluations increase the expected price of design quality and exacerbate an auctioneer's uncertaint...
