Disclosure policy choices under regulatory threat

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Suijs, Jeroen; Wielhouwer, Jacco L.
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12260
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 3-28
• 关键词: sarbanes-oxley act; voluntary disclosures; self-regulation; INFORMATION; MARKET; EFFICIENCY; cournot; conservatism; BEHAVIOR; QUALITY

摘要

This article shows that firms voluntarily increase their disclosures in response to the threat of more stringent disclosure regulations. These disclosures are mostly just sufficient to deter regulation. However, when investment risk is low, both managers and investors might strictly prefer the regulation deterring equilibrium. We further find that in many cases, regulation can only be deterred by asymmetric disclosure behavior of the firms. This suggests that coordination issues and free-riding may be important reasons why self-regulation may fail. The results also indicate the importance of considering political pressure and regulatory threats to explain observed symmetric and asymmetric voluntary disclosure behavior.