作者：Tan, Xu; Wen, Quan
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：A social planner selects heterogeneously biased experts to (either sequentially or simultaneously) acquire costly signals, and then agents vote between two alternatives. To maximize social welfare, the social planner adopts an alternating mechanism-choosing extremely biased experts whose preferences oppose the pivotal voter's current preference-in the optimal sequential mechanism, whereas she chooses mildly biased experts in the optimal simultaneous mechanism. Despite the flexibility of a sequ...
作者：Li, Lingfang (Ivy); Tadelis, Steven; Zhou, Xiaolan
作者单位：Fudan University; Fudan University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; East China Normal University
摘要：Seller reputation, generated by buyer feedback, is critical to fostering trust in online marketplaces. Marketplaces or sellers may choose to compensate buyers for providing feedback. Signaling theory predicts that only sellers of high-quality products will reward buyers for truthful feedback, especially when a product lacks any feedback and when the seller is not established. We confirm these hypotheses using Taobao's reward-for-feedback mechanism. High-quality products, especially without est...
