-
作者：Johnson, Justin P.; Rhodes, Andrew
作者单位：Cornell University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We investigate mergers in markets where quality differences between products are central and firms may reposition their product lines by adding or removing products of different qualities following a merger. Such mergers are materially different from those studied in the existing literature. Mergers without synergies may exhibit a product-mix effect which raises consumer surplus, but only when the pre-merger industry structure satisfies certain observable features. Post-merger synergies may lo...
-
作者：Klein, Timo
作者单位：Utrecht University
摘要：Prices are increasingly set by algorithms. One concern is that intelligent algorithms may learn to collude on higher prices even in the absence of the kind of coordination necessary to establish an antitrust infringement. However, exactly how this may happen is an open question. I show how in simulated sequential competition, competing reinforcement learning algorithms can indeed learn to converge to collusive equilibria when the set of discrete prices is limited. When this set increases, the ...
-
作者：Leahy, Dermot; Neary, J. Peter
作者单位：Maynooth University; University of Oxford
摘要：We compare the effects of changes in trade costs on trade volumes and on the gains from trade under Cournot and Bertrand competition. In both cases, the threshold trade costs below which the possibility of trade affects the domestic firm's behavior is the same; and welfare is U-shaped under reasonable conditions. However, welfare is typically greater under Bertrand competition; for higher trade costs the volume of trade is greater under Cournot competition, implying a van-der-Rohe Region; and,...
-
作者：Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：I study a model of competition between data intermediaries, which collect personal data from consumers and sell them to downstream firms. Competition has a limited impact on benefiting consumers: If intermediaries offer high compensation for data, consumers share data with multiple intermediaries, which lowers the downstream price of data and hurts intermediaries. Anticipating this, intermediaries offer low compensation for data. Although consumers are exclusive suppliers of data, the nonrival...
-
作者：Asker, John; Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Lee, SangMok
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being nonrivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption-that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalit...
-
作者：Brehm, Paul A.; Lewis, Eric
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Oberlin College; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We exploit a government oil lease lottery that randomly assigned leases to individuals and firms. We examine how initial misallocation affected trade, drilling, and production outcomes. When parcels are far from existing production, leases won by individuals have similar drilling and production outcomes as those won by firms. However, for parcels close to existing production, we find that leases are about 50% less likely to be drilled when they are won by firms. We find evidence that informati...
-
作者：Sheu, Gloria; Taragin, Charles
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We model a two-level supply chain where Nash bargaining occurs upstream and firms compete in a logit setting downstream, either via Bertrand price setting or an auction. The parameters can be calibrated with a discrete set of data on prices, margins, and market shares, facilitating use by antitrust practitioners. We perform numerical simulations to identify cases where modelling the full vertical structure is important and where harm is likely. We also examine the thwarted Anthem/Cigna merger ...
-
作者：Hollenbeck, Brett; Uetake, Kosuke
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Yale University
摘要：We study tax and regulatory policy in the legal marijuana market using unique administrative data from Washington state. Washington's retail entry restrictions have resulted in firms with substantial market power who behave like local monopolists. We show how the presence of market power causes tax and regulatory policy recommendations to differ from standard models that assume perfect competition. Combining structural demand models with measured pass-through, we show that marijuana is not ove...
