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作者：Aryal, Gaurab; Zincenko, Federico
作者单位：Boston University; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We propose an empirical framework for asymmetric Cournot oligopoly with private information about variable costs. First, considering a linear demand for a homogeneous product with a random intercept, we characterize the Bayesian Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Then we establish the identification of the joint distribution of demand and firm-specific cost distributions. Following the identification steps, we propose a likelihood-based estimation method and apply it to the global market for crude oil ...
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作者：Astebro, Thomas; Fernandez, Manuel; Lovo, Stefano; Vulkan, Nir
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Universidad de los Andes - Chile; University of Oxford
摘要：We build a model of equity crowdfunding that incorporates the two major funding models: all-or-nothing (AoN) and keep-it-all (KIA). Both informed and uninformed investors arrive sequentially and rationally choose whether and how much to invest. The KIA solution turns out to be a reduced version of AoN without signalling. We test predictions using data from a leading European equity crowdfunding platform and find support. Results are consistent with rational information aggregation. However, ne...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Williams, Cole
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：We show that in search markets an influencer who recommends a product to her followers improves consumer surplus and total welfare despite the firm paying for her recommendation. As consumers learn their value for the product upon search, they will not buy at the recommended firm if they learn their value is low. The threat of search incentivizes firms to offer the influencer a financial contract involving a commission and incentivizes the influencer to be honest in her recommendation. Provide...
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作者：DePiper, Geret; Holzer, Jorge
作者单位：National Oceanic Atmospheric Admin (NOAA) - USA; National Oceanic Atmospheric Admin (NOAA) - USA; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We study incentives to mislabel output in multispecies fisheries managed by tradeable catch shares. Firms can save quota costs by misreporting species harvested, as seen in criminal proceedings against the Codfather. We show that price elasticities for the abundant species reported in the cheating will be higher for compliant than non-compliant firms. Using data from the New England groundfish fishery, we test this prediction using a latent class hedonic price equation to identify compliant ve...
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作者：Garrido, Francisco
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：I show equilibrium existence for a price-setting game among multi-product firms facing a nested logit/CES demand. As opposed to previous research I allow arbitrary firm/nest overlap, making the result relevant for applied work. Additionally, under easy-to-verify conditions, I show that there exist extreme equilibria, which are the most and least preferred by consumers, and provide an algorithm to find them. This allows researcher to numerically verify equilibrium uniqueness in applications, th...
