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作者：Gomes, Renato; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Central Bank of Brazil; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Northwestern University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We introduce a model of (platform-mediated) many-to-many matching in which agents' preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. We first show how the model can be used to derive the profit-maximizing matching plans under customized pricing. We then investigate the implications for targeting and welfare of uniform pricing (be it explicitly mandated or induced by privacy regulation), preventing the platform from conditioning prices on agents' profiles. The model can be applie...
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作者：Gong, Qiang; Xu, Yujing; Yang, Huanxing
作者单位：Zhongnan University of Economics & Law; Shenzhen University; Audencia; Shenzhen University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study a dynamic model of price competition with differentiated products in which new generations of consumers acquire information about available products from their friends of previous generations. The social network, which links consumers across generations, affects the evolution of consumers' awareness of products and firms' long-term (steady-state) market shares. Focusing on steady-state equilibria, we examine how the structure of the social network-including connectivity and homophily-...
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作者：Bollinger, Bryan; Doraszelski, Ulrich; Judd, Kenneth L.; McDevitt, Ryan C.
作者单位：New York University; University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University; Duke University
摘要：We develop and analyze a dynamic model in which firms decide when and where to enter a growing market. We do not pre-specify the order of entry, allowing instead for the leader and follower to be determined endogenously. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic game and show the times and locations of entry are governed by the threat of preemption, which leads to premature entry, less extreme locations, and the dissipation of rents. Using data on gas stations, restaurants,...
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作者：Marku, Keler; Ocampo, Sergio; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
摘要：Business activities often involve a common agent managing a variety of projects on behalf of investors with potentially conflicting interests. The extent of the agent's actions is also often unknown to investors, who have to design contracts that provide incentives to the manager despite this lack of crucial knowledge. We consider a game between several principals and a common agent, where principals know only a subset of the actions available to the agent. Principals demand robustness and eva...
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作者：Wu, Xiaosong; Lewis, Matthew S.; Wolak, Frank A.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Clemson University; Stanford University
摘要：This article estimates a model of optimal search where consumers learn the distribution of gasoline prices during their driving trips. Our model incorporates traffic information and leverages this ordered search environment to recover parameters of the search and learning process using only station-level price and market share data. We find that learning is a crucial component of search in this market. Consumers' prior beliefs regularly deviate from the true price distribution but are updated ...
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作者：Strausz, Roland
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：A multi-product monopolist sells sequentially to a buyer who privately learns his valuations. Using big data, the monopolist learns the intertemporal correlation of the buyer's valuations. Perfect price discrimination is generally unattainable-even when the seller learns the correlation perfectly, has full commitment, and in the limit where the consumption good about which the buyer has ex ante private information becomes insignificant. This impossibility is due to informational externalities ...
