Price customization and targeting in matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gomes, Renato; Pavan, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Central Bank of Brazil; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Northwestern University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12464
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 230-265
• 关键词: platform competition; monopoly; DISCRIMINATION; INFORMATION; demand

摘要

We introduce a model of (platform-mediated) many-to-many matching in which agents' preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. We first show how the model can be used to derive the profit-maximizing matching plans under customized pricing. We then investigate the implications for targeting and welfare of uniform pricing (be it explicitly mandated or induced by privacy regulation), preventing the platform from conditioning prices on agents' profiles. The model can be applied to study ad exchanges, online retailing, and media markets.