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作者：Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver J.; Kawamura, Kohei
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences and a uniform type distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there exists a level of noise that makes it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the model without noise, equilib...
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作者：Chung, Kim-Sau; Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Hong Kong; Northwestern University
摘要：We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is equipped with the Euclidean topology. Our sufficient condition is stronger than connectedness but weaker than smooth arcwise connectedness. Our result generalizes all existing revenue equivalence theorems wh...
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作者：Chamley, Christophe
作者单位：Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Boston University
摘要：In a financial market where agents trade for short-term profit and where news can increase the uncertainty of the public belief, there are strategic complementarities in the acquisition of private information and, if the cost of information is sufficiently small, a continuum of equilibrium strategies. Imperfect observation of past prices reduces the continuum of Nash equilibria to a Strongly Rational-Expectations Equilibrium. In that equilibrium, there are two sharply different regimes for the...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Marinacci, Massimo; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Boston University; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin; University of Rochester
摘要：The paper considers an agent who must choose an action today under uncertainty about the consequence of any chosen action but without having in mind a complete list of all the contingencies that could influence outcomes. She conceives of some relevant (subjective) contingencies but she is aware that these contingencies are coarse-they leave out some details that may affect outcomes. Though she may not be able to describe these finer details, she is aware that they exist and this may affect her...
