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作者：Saporiti, Alejandro
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：This paper analyzes strategy-proof collective choice rules when individuals have single-crossing preferences on a finite and ordered set of social alternatives. It shows that a social choice rule is anonymous, unanimous, and strategy-proof on a maximal single-crossing domain if and only if it is an extended median rule with n - 1 fixed ballots distributed over the individuals' most preferred alternatives. As a by-product, the paper also proves that strategy-proofness implies the tops-only prop...
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作者：Board, Simon
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision systematically leads to two distortions relative to the efficient solution: first, agents are segregated too finely; second, too many agents are excluded from all groups. We demonstrate that these distortions are ...
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作者：Kim, KyungMin
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A key to the Coase conjecture is the monopolist's inability to commit to a price, which leads consumers to believe that a high current price will be followed by low future prices. This paper studies the robustness of the Coase conjecture with respect to these beliefs of consumers. In particular, there is uncertainty over whether the monopolist is committed to a price (i.e. she may be a commitment type). Consequently, consumers are no longer certain that the price will change over time. I consi...
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作者：Piccione, Michele; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze the structure of a society driven by power relations. Our model has an exogenous power relation over the set of coalitions of agents. Agents determine the social order by forming coalitions. The power relations determine the ranking of agents in society for any social order. We study a cooperative game in partition function form and introduce a solution concept, the stable social order, which exists and includes the core. We investigate a refinement, the strongly stable social order...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be distinguished by their rationalizable strategic choices without any prior knowledge of their beliefs and higher order beliefs. We show that two payoff types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they satisfy a separability condition. The separability condition for each agent essentially requires that there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents. A social choice func...
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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We establish that the fraction of preference profiles for which the random serial dictatorship allocation is ordinally efficient vanishes for allocation problems with many object types. We consider also a probabilistic setting where in expectation agents have moderately similar preferences reflecting varying popularity across objects. In this setting we show that the probability that the random serial dictatorship mechanism is ordinally efficient converges to zero as the number of object types...
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作者：Koriyama, Yukio; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper analyzes the optimal size of a deliberating committee where (i) there is no conflict of interest among individuals and (ii) information acquisition is costly. The committee members simultaneously decide whether to acquire information, and then make the ex-post efficient decision. The optimal committee size, k*, is shown to be bounded. The main result of this paper is that any arbitrarily large committee aggregates the decentralized information more efficiently than the committee of ...
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作者：Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：When confronted with uncertain prospects, people often exhibit both choice deferral and Ellsberg-type ambiguity aversion. This paper obtains a joint representation for these behavioral phenomena. The decision maker as portrayed by my model is willing to choose an uncertain prospect f over g rather than to defer this choice if and only if the expected utility of f is greater that or equal to the expected utility of g for every probability measure in a convex and closed set Delta. This set is in...
