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作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Universidad de Chile
摘要：This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. To establish these results, we introduce a notion of regularity for dynamic stochastic games and exploit a simple connection between normal form and dynamic stochastic games.
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作者：Mathevet, Laurent
摘要：This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism that generates bounded strategic substitutes-as opposed to strategic complementarities-then t...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Di Tillio, Alfredo; Faingold, Eduardo; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Yale University; Rice University
摘要：We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform-weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. This topology generalizes the now classic notion...
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作者：Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time period has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. The monopoly may be induced to deliver the good if consumers expect that the monopoly will not deliver in the future if it does not deliver today. If the good is nondurable and consumers are anonymous, the monopoly's optimal strategy is to set a price equal to the static monopoly price each period if the discount factor is high enough, and o...
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Boston University; Northwestern University
摘要：The de Finetti Theorem is a cornerstone of the Bayesian approach. Bernardo (1996, p. 5) writes that its message is very clear: if a sequence of observations is judged to be exchangeable, then any subset of them must be regarded as a random sample from some model, and there exists a prior distribution on the parameter of such model, hence requiring a Bayesian approach. We argue that although exchangeability, interpreted as symmetry of evidence, is a weak assumption, when combined with subjectiv...
