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作者：Myerson, Roger B.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We consider a simple political-economic model where capitalist investment is constrained by the government's temptation to expropriate. Political liberalization can relax this constraint, increasing the government's revenue, but also increasing the ruler's political risks. We analyze the ruler's optimal liberalization, where our measure of political liberalization is the probability of the ruler being replaced if he tried to expropriate private investments. Poorer endowments can support reputa...
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作者：Segal, Ilya R.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The paper considers the communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social choice rules. A key distinction is whether we restrict to the traditional one-stage mechanisms or allow multistage mechanisms. For one-stage mechanisms, the paper shows that for a large and important subclass of monotonic choice rules-called intersection monotonic-the total message space size needed for one-stage Nash implementation is essentially the same as that needed for ver...
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作者：Noor, Jawwad; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Boston University; Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper extends the theory of temptation and self-control introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to allow for increasing marginal costs of resisting temptation, that is, convex self-control costs. It also proves a representation theorem that admits a general class of self-control cost functions. Both models maintain the Order, Continuity, and Set Betweenness axioms but violate Independence.
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作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Universidad de Chile
摘要：This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. To establish these results, we introduce a notion of regularity for dynamic stochastic games and exploit a simple connection between normal form and dynamic stochastic games.
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作者：Mathevet, Laurent
摘要：This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice function can be implemented by a mechanism that generates bounded strategic substitutes-as opposed to strategic complementarities-then t...
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作者：Kalandrakis, Tasos
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter has preferences that admit a (quasi) concave utility representation? I derive necessary and sufficient conditions and a tractable algorithm to verify their validity. I show that the hypothesis that the voter has preferences represented by a concave utility function is observationally equivalent to the hypothesis that she has preferences represented by a quasiconcave utility function, I obtain testabl...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Di Tillio, Alfredo; Faingold, Eduardo; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Yale University; Rice University
摘要：We study the robustness of interim correlated rationalizability to perturbations of higher-order beliefs. We introduce a new metric topology on the universal type space, called uniform-weak topology, under which two types are close if they have similar first-order beliefs, attach similar probabilities to other players having similar first-order beliefs, and so on, where the degree of similarity is uniform over the levels of the belief hierarchy. This topology generalizes the now classic notion...
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作者：Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time period has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. The monopoly may be induced to deliver the good if consumers expect that the monopoly will not deliver in the future if it does not deliver today. If the good is nondurable and consumers are anonymous, the monopoly's optimal strategy is to set a price equal to the static monopoly price each period if the discount factor is high enough, and o...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：A population of agents recurrently plays a two-strategy population game. When an agent receives a revision opportunity, he chooses a new strategy using a noisy best response rule that satisfies mild regularity conditions; best response with mutations, logit choice, and probit choice are all permitted. We study the long run behavior of the resulting Markov process when the noise level eta is small and the population size N is large. We obtain a precise characterization of the asymptotics of the...
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Meyn, Sean P.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：This paper examines a dynamic general equilibrium model with supply friction. With or without friction, the competitive equilibrium is efficient. Without friction, the market price is completely determined by the marginal production cost. If friction is present, no matter how small, then the market price fluctuates between zero and the choke-up price, without any tendency to converge to the marginal production cost, exhibiting considerable volatility. The distribution of the gains from trading...
