A theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games: Genericity, stability, and purification

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1555-7561
• DOI: 10.3982/TE632
• 发表日期: 2010-09-01
• 页码: 369-402
• 关键词: Dynamic stochastic games; Markov perfect equilibrium; REGULARITY; genericity; FINITENESS; strong stability; essentiality; purifiability; estimation; computation; repeated games

摘要

This paper studies generic properties of Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. To establish these results, we introduce a notion of regularity for dynamic stochastic games and exploit a simple connection between normal form and dynamic stochastic games.