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作者：Myerson, Roger B.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We consider a simple political-economic model where capitalist investment is constrained by the government's temptation to expropriate. Political liberalization can relax this constraint, increasing the government's revenue, but also increasing the ruler's political risks. We analyze the ruler's optimal liberalization, where our measure of political liberalization is the probability of the ruler being replaced if he tried to expropriate private investments. Poorer endowments can support reputa...
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作者：Segal, Ilya R.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The paper considers the communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social choice rules. A key distinction is whether we restrict to the traditional one-stage mechanisms or allow multistage mechanisms. For one-stage mechanisms, the paper shows that for a large and important subclass of monotonic choice rules-called intersection monotonic-the total message space size needed for one-stage Nash implementation is essentially the same as that needed for ver...
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作者：Kalandrakis, Tasos
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：When is a finite number of binary voting choices consistent with the hypothesis that the voter has preferences that admit a (quasi) concave utility representation? I derive necessary and sufficient conditions and a tractable algorithm to verify their validity. I show that the hypothesis that the voter has preferences represented by a concave utility function is observationally equivalent to the hypothesis that she has preferences represented by a quasiconcave utility function, I obtain testabl...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：A population of agents recurrently plays a two-strategy population game. When an agent receives a revision opportunity, he chooses a new strategy using a noisy best response rule that satisfies mild regularity conditions; best response with mutations, logit choice, and probit choice are all permitted. We study the long run behavior of the resulting Markov process when the noise level eta is small and the population size N is large. We obtain a precise characterization of the asymptotics of the...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We prove that any regular evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
