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作者：Martimort, David; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：The provision of public goods under asymmetric information has most often been viewed as a mechanism design problem under the aegis of an uninformed mediator. This paper focuses on institutional contexts without such a mediator. Contributors privately informed on their willingness to pay non-cooperatively offer contribution schedules to an agent who produces the public good on their behalf. In any separating and informative equilibrium of this common agency game under asymmetric information, i...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We prove that any regular evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Seo, Kyoungwon
作者单位：Boston University; Northwestern University
摘要：The de Finetti Theorem is a cornerstone of the Bayesian approach. Bernardo (1996, p. 5) writes that its message is very clear: if a sequence of observations is judged to be exchangeable, then any subset of them must be regarded as a random sample from some model, and there exists a prior distribution on the parameter of such model, hence requiring a Bayesian approach. We argue that although exchangeability, interpreted as symmetry of evidence, is a weak assumption, when combined with subjectiv...
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作者：Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Munich
摘要：We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We considerMarkov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable and show that all such equilibria exhibit an encouragement effect relative to the single-agent optimum. There is no equilibrium in which all players use cutoff strategies. Owing to the encouragement effect, asymm...
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作者：Virag, Gabor
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for buyers by setting reserve prices. An outstanding conjecture (e.g., Peters and Severinov 1997) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the market becomes large. This conjecture is confirmed in this paper: we show that if all sellers have zero costs, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to 0 in distribution. Under further conditions there is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. In t...
