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作者：Nakajima, Daisuke
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper investigates first-price and Dutch auctions when bidders have preferences exhibiting the Allais paradox. We characterize an equilibrium for both auctions, paying particular attention to the dynamic inconsistency problems that can arise with such preferences. We show that the Dutch auction systematically yields a higher revenue than the first-price auction. This stands in sharp contrast to the presumption that these auctions are strategically equivalent, which is indeed valid in the ...
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作者：Hofbauer, Josef; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.
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作者：Robson, Arthur; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Yale University
摘要：Psychologists report that people make choices on the basis of decision utilities that routinely overestimate the experienced utility consequences of these choices. This paper argues that this dichotomy between decision and experienced utilities may be the solution to an evolutionary design problem. We examine a setting in which evolution designs agents with utility functions that must mediate intertemporal choices, and in which there is an incentive to condition current utilities on the agent'...
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作者：Siniscalchi, Marciano
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes dynamic choice for decision makers whose preferences violate Savage's sure-thing principle (Savage 1954) and, therefore, give rise to violations of dynamic consistency. The consistent-planning approach introduced by Strotz (1955-1956) provides one way to deal with dynamic inconsistencies; however, consistent planning is typically interpreted as a solution concept for a game played by multiple selves of the same individual. The main result of this paper shows that consistent...
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作者：Hayashi, Takashi; Miao, Jianjun
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Boston University; Central University of Finance & Economics; Zhejiang University
摘要：In this paper, we establish an axiomatically founded generalized recursive smooth ambiguity model that allows for a separation among intertemporal substitution, risk aversion, and ambiguity aversion. We axiomatize this model using two approaches: the second-order act approach a la Klibanoff et al. (2005) and the two-stage randomization approach a la Seo (2009). We characterize risk attitude and ambiguity attitude within these two approaches. We then discuss our model's application in asset pri...
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作者：Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets (Ehlers 2007), vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the c...
