von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.; Vergote, Wouter
• 署名单位: Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE527
• 发表日期: 2011-09-01
• 页码: 499-521
• 关键词: Matching problem; von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets; farsighted stability

摘要

We adopt the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) farsightedly stable sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable sets (Ehlers 2007), vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong core.