-
作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR). Here we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call extensive form best response sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely directed rationalizability (Battigalli and S...
-
作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks, and that the monitoring is sufficiently connected. In all repeated game equilibria, each period play is an equilibrium of the stage game. When the monitoring is approximately connected and equilibrium str...
-
作者：Dillenberger, David; Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Duke University
摘要：We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient, whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selfishly under observation, in the sense of not choosing the normatively best allocation, inflicts shame on the DM. We deriv...
-
作者：Balasko, Yves
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：It is shown that two arbitrary equilibria in the general equilibrium model without sign restrictions on endowments can be joined by a continuous equilibrium path that contains at most two critical equilibria. This property is strengthened by showing that regular equilibria having an index equal to 1, a necessary condition for stability, can be joined by a path containing no critical equilibrium. These properties follow from the real-algebraic nature of the set of critical equilibria in any fib...
-
作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：Among the most important and robust violations of rationality are the attraction and the compromise effects. The compromise effect refers to the tendency of individuals to choose an intermediate option in a choice set, while the attraction effect refers to the tendency to choose an option that dominates some other options in the choice set. This paper argues that both effects may result from an individual's attempt to overcome the difficulty of making a choice in the absence of a single criter...
