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作者：Ravikumar, B.; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study the optimal auditing of a taxpayer's income in a dynamic principalagent model of hidden income. Taxpayers in our model initially have low income and stochastically transit to high income that is an absorbing state. A low-income taxpayer who transits to high income can underreport his true income and evade his taxes. With a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function and a costly and imperfect auditing technology, we show that the optimal auditing mechanism in our model consists o...
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作者：Buzard, Kristy; Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a nondurable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts (nonforcing contracts) are explored. The paper introduces the distinction between divided and unified investment and trade actions, and it shows the key role this distinction plays in determining whether efficient investment and trade can be achieved. Under a nonforcing dual-option...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Columbia University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：We generalize the canonical problem of Nash implementation by allowing agents to voluntarily provide discriminatory signals, i.e., evidence. Evidence can either take the form of hard information or, more generally, have differential but nonprohibitive costs in different states. In such environments, social choice functions that are not Maskin-monotonic can be implemented. We formulate a more general property, evidence monotonicity, and show that this is a necessary condition for implementation...
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作者：Wiseman, Thomas
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature's choice. Over time, they can learn the state in two ways. After each round, each player observes his own realized payoff (which may be stochastic, conditional on the state) and he observes a noisy public signal of the state (whose informativeness may ...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University; Yale University
摘要：This paper examines circumstances under which subjectivity enhances the effectiveness of inductive reasoning. We consider agents facing a data-generating process who are characterized by inference rules that may be purely objective (or data-based) or may incorporate subjective considerations. Agents who invoke no subjective considerations are doomed to ineffective learning. The analysis places no computational or memory limitations on the agents: the role for subjectivity emerges in the presen...
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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Hao, Li; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Hong Kong; University of British Columbia
摘要：Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the end, or a deadlock, in which concessions end permanently. Extending the deadline hurts the players in the first case, but is beneficial in the second. When the initial conflict between the negotiating ...
