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作者：Noguchi, Yuichi
摘要：In this paper, I provide a characterization of a set of probability measures with which a prior weakly merges. In this regard, I introduce the concept of conditioning rules that represent the regularities of probability measures and define the eventual generation of probability measures by a family of conditioning rules. I then show that a set of probability measures is learnable (i.e., all probability measures in the set are weakly merged by a prior) if and only if all probability measures in...
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作者：Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; de Marti, Joan; Prat, Andrea
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; ICREA; Barcelona School of Economics; Pompeu Fabra University; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and pairwise passive communication (listening). This leads to a full characterization of information and influence flows. Second, we show that when the coordination motive dominates the adaptation motive, th...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
摘要：The study of matching problems typically assumes that agents precisely know their preferences over the goods to be assigned. Within applied contexts, this assumption stands out as particularly counterfactual. Parents typically do invest a large amount of time and resources to find the best school for their children; doctors run costly tests to establish the best kidney for a given patient. In this paper, I introduce the assumption of endogenous information acquisition into otherwise standard h...
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作者：Kaya, Ayca; Liu, Qingmin
作者单位：University of Miami; Columbia University
摘要：We study the role that price transparency plays in determining the efficiency and surplus division in a sequential bargaining model of price formation with asymmetric information. Under natural assumptions on type distributions and for any discount factor, we show that the unobservability of past negotiations leads to lower prices and faster trading. Unobservability, therefore, enhances the Coasian effect by fostering efficiency and diverting more of the surplus to the player who possesses pri...
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作者：Kesten, Onur; Uenver, M. Utku
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Boston College
摘要：We introduce a new notion of ex ante stability (or fairness) that would be desirable for a school-choice mechanism to satisfy. Our criterion stipulates that a mechanism must be stable based solely on the probabilities that each student will be assigned to different schools, i.e., the assignment must be viewed as stable even before students know which school they will end up going to. This is in contrast to much of the existing literature, which has instead focused on ex post stability, meaning...
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作者：Ergin, Haluk; Sarver, Todd
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Duke University
摘要：We study preferences for timing of resolution of objective uncertainty in a menu-choice model with two stages of information arrival. We characterize a general class of utility representations called hidden action representations, which interpret an intrinsic preference for timing of resolution of uncertainty as if an unobservable action is taken between the resolution of the two periods of information arrival. These representations permit a richer class of preferences for timing than was poss...
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作者：Bouton, Laurent; Gratton, Gabriele
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties and of voters' behavior is limited. In this paper, we fully characterize the set of strictly perfect voting equilibria in large three-candidate majority runoff elections. Considering all possible distributions of preference orderings and intensities, we prove that only two types of equilibria can exist. First, there are always equilibria in which only two candidates receive votes. Second, there ...
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作者：Baetz, Oliver
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper develops a simple model in which a social hierarchy emerges endogenously when agents form a network for complementary interaction (activity). Specifically, we assume that agents are ex ante identical and their best response activity, as well as their value function, increases (strictly) concavely in the total activity of their neighbors in the network. There exists a unique and stable positive activity equilibrium on exogenous networks under mild conditions. When we endogenize netwo...
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作者：Sher, Itai; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministichence, akin to classic third degree price discriminationindependently of nonevidence characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence is hierarchical. Wh...
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作者：Morimoto, Shuhei; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Kobe University; University of Osaka
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule is the rule that assigns a minimum price Walrasian equilibrium allocation to each preference profile. We establish that the MPW rule is the ...
