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作者：Pablo Arribillaga, R.; Masso, Jordi
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We propose a simple criterion to compare generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability. We identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of two generalized median voter schemes in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. The three conditions are stated using the two associated families of monotonic fixed ballots and depend very much on the power each agent has to unilaterally change the outcomes of the two generalized median voter schemes. W...
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作者：Abizada, Azar
作者单位：Ministry of Education of Azerbaijan Republic; ADA University
摘要：We study two-sided matching where one side (colleges) can make monetary transfers (offer stipends) to the other (students). Colleges have fixed budgets and strict preferences over sets of students. One different feature of our model is that colleges value money only to the extent that it allows them to enroll better or additional students. A student can attend at most one college and receive a stipend from it. Each student has preferences over college-stipend bundles. Conditions that are essen...
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作者：Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Ely, Jeffrey C.
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney; Northwestern University
摘要：We study optimal price discrimination when a monopolist faces a continuum of consumers with reference-dependent preferences. A consumer's valuation for product quality consists of an intrinsic valuation affected by a private state signal (type) and a gain-loss valuation that depends on deviations of purchased quality from a reference point. Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), we consider lossaverse buyers who evaluate gains and losses in terms of changes in the consumption valuation, but in ou...
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作者：Kominers, Scott Duke; Sonmez, Tayfun
作者单位：Harvard University; Boston College
摘要：We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches that may have multiple slots available to accept contracts. Each slot has its own linear priority order over contracts; a branch chooses contracts by filling its slots sequentially, according to an order of precedence. We demonstrate that in these matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions typicall...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Meneghel, Idione; Tourky, Rabee
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Queensland
摘要：We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games of incomplete information set in L. J. Savage's framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. However, Savage games are free of priors, probabilities, and payoffs. Players' information and subjective attitudes toward uncertainty are encoded in the state-dependent preferences over state contingent action profiles. In the class of games we consider, player preferences satisfy v...
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作者：Moreno, Diego; Wooders, John
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：We study nonstationary dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection in which trade is bilateral and prices are determined by bargaining. Examples include labor markets, housing markets, and markets for financial assets. We characterize equilibrium, and identify the dynamics of transaction prices, trading patterns, and the average quality in the market. When the horizon is finite, the surplus in the unique equilibrium exceeds the competitive surplus; as traders become perfectly patient,...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University
摘要：A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game and an information structure. The basic game defines the set of actions, the set of payoff states, the payoff functions, and the common prior over the payoff states. The information structure refers to the signals that the players receive in the game. We characterize the set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibrium if players observe the given information structure but may also observe additional signals. The char...
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul c...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：As in Gilboa et al. (2010), we consider a decision maker characterized by two binary relations: greater than or similar to* and greater than or similar to<^>. The first binary relation is a Bewley preference. It models the rankings for which the decision maker is sure. The second binary relation is an uncertainty averse preference, as defined by Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011c). It models the rankings that the decision maker expresses if he has to make a choice. We assume that greater than or si...
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作者：Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：A choice function is list rational(izable) if there is a fixed list such that for each choice set, successive comparison of the alternatives by following the list retrieves the chosen alternative. We extend the formulation of list rationality to stochastic choice setup. We say two alternatives are related if the stochastic path independence condition is violated between these alternatives. We show that a random choice function is list rational if and only if this relation is acyclic. Our chara...
