A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterji, Shurojit; Sen, Arunava; Zeng, Huaxia
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE1972
• 发表日期: 2016-05-01
• 页码: 711-733
• 关键词: Random social choice functions; strategy-proofness; compromise; single-peaked preferences

摘要

This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favor of the Gul conjecture (Barbera 2010).