-
作者：Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We study the repeated implementation of social choice functions in environments with complete information and changing preferences. We define dynamic monotonicity, a natural but nontrivial dynamic extension of Maskin monotonicity, and show that it is necessary and almost sufficient for repeated Nash implementation, regardless of whether the horizon is finite or infinite and whether the discount factor is large or small.
-
作者：Dean, Mark; Ortoleva, Pietro
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behavior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously. We introduce a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both objective lotteries and uncertain acts. We show that this axiom, together with other standard ones, is equivalent to a representation in which the agent (i) evaluates ambiguity using multiple priors, as ...
-
作者：Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert D.; Lavi, Ron; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Cornell University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns out that by introducing job security, stability and efficiency may still prevail, and even for a significantly broader class of production functions.
