Job security, stability, and production efficiency

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fu, Hu; Kleinberg, Robert D.; Lavi, Ron; Smorodinsky, Rann
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Cornell University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2016
• 发表日期: 2017-01-01
• 页码: 1-24
• 关键词: Matching; STABILITY; labor market; job security; EFFICIENCY

摘要

We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns out that by introducing job security, stability and efficiency may still prevail, and even for a significantly broader class of production functions.