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作者：Dasaratha, Krishna; He, Kevin
作者单位：Harvard University; California Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents apply a heuristic rule to aggregate predecessors' actions. They weigh these actions according the strengths of their social connections to different predecessors. We show this rule arises endogenously when agents wrongly believe others act solely on private information and thus neglect redundancies among observations. We provide a simple linear formula expressing agents' action...
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作者：Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Osaka
摘要：This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (i) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property, (ii) we establish a revenue uniqueness result (for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule that can implement it), and (iii) we show that every dominant strategy incentive compatible, individually rational, and revenue-ma...
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作者：Kimya, Mert
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：I develop two related solution concepts-equilibrium coalitional behavior and credible equilibrium coalitional behavior-that capture foresight and impose the requirement that each coalition in a sequence of coalitional moves chooses optimally among all its available options. The model does not require, but may use, the apparatus of a dynamic process or a protocol that specifies the negotiation procedure underlying coalition formation. Therefore, it forms a bridge between the non-cooperative and...
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作者：Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean-preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk-taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, this concavity constraint binds and so linear contracts maximize profit. If the agent is risk averse, the concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show ho...
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作者：He Wei; Sun Yeneng
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite- or infinite-horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alte...
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作者：Bianchi, Milo; Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study banks' incentive to pool assets of heterogeneous quality when investors evaluate pools by extrapolating from limited sampling. Pooling assets of heterogeneous quality induces dispersion in investors' valuations without affecting their average. Prices are determined by market clearing assuming that investors can neither borrow nor short-sell. A monopolistic bank has the incentive to create heterogeneous bundles only when investors have enough money. When the number of banks is sufficie...
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作者：Almagro, Milena; Andres-Cerezo, David
作者单位：New York University; European University Institute
摘要：This paper explores the dynamics of nation-building policies and the conditions under which a state can promote a shared national identity on its territory. A forward-looking central government that internalizes identity dynamics shapes them by choosing the level of state centralization. Homogenization attempts are constrained by political unrest, electoral competition and the intergenerational transmission of identities within the family. We find nation-building efforts are generally characte...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Swinkels, Jeroen
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Northwestern University
摘要：We define and explore no-upward-crossing (NUC), a condition satisfied by every parameterized family of distributions commonly used in economic applications. Under smoothness assumptions, NUC is equivalent to log-supermodularity of the negative of the derivative of the distribution with respect to the parameter. It is characterized by a natural monotone comparative static and is central in establishing quasi-concavity in a family of decision problems. As an application, we revisit the first-ord...
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作者：Letina, Igor; Liu, Shuo; Netzer, Nick
作者单位：University of Bern; Peking University; University of Zurich
摘要：We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance is evaluated by a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal fixes a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer's potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely...
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作者：Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A firm (the principal) and a worker (the agent) interact for potentially infinitely many periods. The worker is privately informed about his productivity and the firm can only commit to short-term contracts. The ratchet effect is in place since the firm has the incentive to change the terms of trade and offer more demanding contracts when it learns that the worker is highly productive. As the parties become arbitrarily...
