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作者：Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction with interdependent valuations and private budget constraints. Focusing on the two-bidder case, we identify new sufficient conditions for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. In equilibrium, agents may adopt discontinuous bidding strategies that result in a stratification of competition along the budget dimension. Private budgets can simultaneously lead to more aggressive bidding (a high-budget agent leverages his wealth to outb...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Hu, Gaoji
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and each firm cares about the type of her employee under a match. Moreover, firms' information structure is described by partitions over possible worker type profiles. With this firm-specific information, we propose a stability notion which, in addition to requiring individual rationality and no blocking pairs, captures the idea...
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作者：Heumann, Tibor
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal
摘要：We study a principal-agent model. The parties are symmetrically informed at first; the principal then designs the process by which the agent learns his type and, concurrently, the screening mechanism. Because the agent can opt out of the mechanism ex post, it must leave him with nonnegative rents ex post. We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism. In that optimal mechanism, learning proceeds in continuous time and, at each moment, the agent learns a lower bound on his type. For each type...
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作者：Golosov, Mikhail; Menzio, Guido
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：We develop a theory of endogenous and stochastic fluctuations in economic activity. Individual firms choose to randomize over firing or keeping workers who performed poorly in the past to give them an ex ante incentive to exert effort. Different firms choose to correlate the outcome of their randomization to reduce the probability with which they fire nonperforming workers. Correlated randomization leads to aggregate fluctuations. Aggregate fluctuations are endogenous-they emerge because firms...
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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Warwick; Ashoka University; University of Helsinki
摘要：Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance, by Harsanyi and Ray and Vohra, have typically been based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain of coalitional moves in which each coalition that is involved in the sequence eventually stands to gain. Dutta and Vohra point out that these solution concepts do not require coalitions to make optimal moves. Hence, these ...
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作者：Baisa, Brian; Burkett, Justin
作者单位：Amherst College; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We present a model of a discriminatory price auction in which a large bidder competes against many small bidders, followed by a post-auction resale stage in which the large bidder is endogenously determined to be a buyer or a seller. We extend results on first-price auctions with resale to this setting and use these results to give a tractable characterization of equilibrium behavior. We use this characterization to study the policy of capping the amount that may be won by large bidders in the...
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作者：Li, Wei; Tan, Xu
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Agents in a network want to learn the true state of the world from their own signals and their neighbors' reports. Agents know only their local networks, consisting of their neighbors and the links among them. Every agent is Bayesian with the (possibly misspecified) prior belief that her local network is the entire network. We present a tractable learning rule to implement such locally Bayesian learning: each agent extracts new information using the full history of observed reports in her loca...
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作者：Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Nakajima, Daisuke; Ozdenoren, Emre
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Otaru University of Commerce; University of London; London Business School
摘要：This paper provides a behavioral foundation for modeling willpower as a limited cognitive resource that bridges the standard utility maximization and Strotz models. Using the agent's ex ante preferences and ex post choices, we derive a representation that captures key behavioral traits of willpower-constrained decision making. We use the model to study the pricing problem of a profit-maximizing monopolist who faces consumers with limited willpower. We show that the optimal contract often consi...
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作者：Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Basque Country
摘要：Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989) Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Y...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Many sales, sports, and research contests are put in place to maximize contestants' performance. We investigate and provide a complete characterization of the prize structures that achieve this objective in settings with many contestants. The contestants may be ex ante asymmetric in their abilities and prize valuations, and there may be complete or incomplete information about these parameters. The prize valuations and performance costs may be linear, concave, or convex. A main novel takeaway ...
