Uncertain rationality, depth of reasoning and robustness in games with incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Germano, Fabrizio; Weinstein, Jonathan; Zuazo-Garin, Peio
• 署名单位: Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Basque Country
• 刊物名称: THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1933-6837
• DOI: 10.3982/TE2734
• 发表日期: 2020-01-01
• 页码: 89-122
• 关键词: robustness; rationalizability; bounded rationality; incomplete information; belief hierarchies

摘要

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989) Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICR lambda, where lambda is a sequence whose term lambda(n) is the probability players attach to (n - 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when lambda(n) is above an appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when lambda(n) converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes.