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作者：Maccarrone, Vincenzo
作者单位：University College Dublin
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作者：Cormier, Ben
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Some use the model of independent central banks to posit that independent Debt Management Offices (DMOs) can enhance public debt sustainability. This study argues this is unlikely in developing countries. Developing country DMOs have limited space to apolitically manage (a) debt levels and (b) borrowing strategies. A comparison of South Africa and Botswana, using in-depth interviews and primary sources, traces public debt processes to argue DMOs are unlikely to significantly affect the link be...
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作者：Kolstad, Ivar
作者单位：Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We analyze the economic performance of countries after a multi-decade political ruler, defined as having been in office 20 or more years, loses power. For 37 countries experiencing such an end-of-reign event in the period 1971-2005, we use an event study approach to compare growth in the decade following the event with growth in pre-event periods. The results show that event countries have below average growth in the year a long-term political leader leaves office and that cumulative growth in...
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作者：Ford, Michele; Gillan, Michael; Ward, Kristy
作者单位：University of Sydney; University of Sydney; University of Western Australia
摘要：Authoritarian states face a fundamental tension in managing labor conflict. Too much repression can be read as a violation of workers' human rights, but too little undermines their structures of control. In this article, we shift focus from the overt repression of workers and unions to consider how states manage labor dissent through governance reform. Using Cambodia as our case, we examine the government's use of a series of authoritarian innovations to reassert control over labor governance ...
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作者：Kennedy, John; Alcantara, Christopher; Armstrong, David, II
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Political parties regularly make promises to the public about what they hope to accomplish if and when they are elected to office. Once in office, the winning party, usually via the executive branch, announces its agenda by delivering a speech from the throne or a state of the union/nation address in the legislature. To what extent are governments able to fulfill the promises they make in these speeches? To answer this question, we investigate the impact of three structural constraints on prom...
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作者：Eckhard, Steffen
作者单位：University of Konstanz
摘要：Bureaucratic representation theory holds that civil servants are not neutral in a Weberian sense. Bureaucrats are thought to actively represent their communities by trying to make them better off. This article proposes an alternative understanding of individual behavior in representation that emphasizes knowledge sharing instead of patronage, but leads to similar outcomes: Their societal background provides officials with advanced social knowledge about the group(s) they represent, including b...
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作者：Peker, Efe
作者单位：University of Ottawa
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作者：Sager, Fritz
作者单位：University of Bern
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作者：Eriksen, Andreas
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet)
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作者：Hofmann, Andreas; Naurin, Daniel
作者单位：Free University of Berlin
摘要：Litigation has long been a part of interest groups' lobbying tactics in the U.S. In Europe, by contrast, taking political conflicts to court has traditionally been viewed with skepticism. However, in the wake of an increasing judicialization of politics in Europe, litigation has also become part of the toolbox of European interest groups. Using original survey data from five European countries, we study how they use that tool. We show that European interest groups go to court somewhat less oft...
