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作者:Meng, Xiaojing
作者单位:New York University
摘要:There are instances where CEO turnover occurs, even if the company has not made any significant strategy changes, and the new CEO possesses similar abilities as the predecessor. This paper aims to provide a rational explanation for this seemingly irrational phenomenon. One possible reason for this aggressive CEO turnover is the board's desire to reduce the information rents earned by the privately informed CEO. Specifically, the incumbent CEO has a temptation to sandbag the board about profita...
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作者:Ahn, Byung Hyun; Bushman, Robert M.; Patatoukas, Panos N.
作者单位:University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要:Although activist short sellers can play a crucial role in fraud detection, they have come under scrutiny following accusations of systematically disseminating false negative information. We develop a framework delineating the roles of campaign-specific private information quality and short-selling dynamics in shaping disclosure incentives. We predict that the act of disclosure combined with pre-disclosure stock lending dynamics is informative about the quality of an activist's private informa...
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作者:Gomez, Enrique A.
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要:I study the effect of the implementation of the SEC's EDGAR system on information asymmetry among investors. The SEC adopted EDGAR to decrease acquisition costs of mandatory filings. However, disclosure theory suggests that, even when acquisition costs are low, integration costs (i.e., costs necessary to filter and interpret information signals) may be so high that less sophisticated investors are disadvantaged, relative to their sophisticated peers. Consistent with this theory, I find evidenc...
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作者:Ashraf, Musaib; Sunder, Jayanthi
作者单位:Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; University of Arizona
摘要:Data breach disclosure laws are state-level disclosure mandates intended to protect individuals from the consequences of identity theft. However, we argue that the laws help reduce shareholder risk by encouraging managers to take real actions to reduce firms' exposure to cyber risk. Consistent with this argument, we find an on -average decrease in shareholder risk, proxied by cost of equity, after the staggered passage of these laws. We also find the effect is attenuated for firms that already...
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作者:Cadman, Brian; Heinle, Mirko S.; Macciocchi, Daniele
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; University of Miami
摘要:We investigate the relationship between insider horizon and disclosure policy. First, we develop and analyze a rational expectations model assuming insiders are able to commit to a disclosure policy. Insiders with a short horizon prefer more disclosure and are willing to bear costs of disclosure to reduce information asymmetries among capital market participants. We then empirically test our predictions in the setting of newly public firms and firms where the CEO is approaching retirement. We ...
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作者:Commerford, Benjamin P.; Mullis, Curtis; Stefaniak, Chad M.
作者单位:University of Kentucky; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
摘要:In a quasi-experiment with external (EA), in-house internal (IIA), and outsourced internal auditors (OIA) as participants in their natural roles, we compare auditors' internal control evaluations in the presence of differing management reporting motives. Grounded in Organizational Identity (OID) Theory, we find EAs' evaluations are more (less) lenient when management's motive is less (more) self-serving. We provide evidence that management's motives affect EAs' evaluations because management i...
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作者:Hendricks, Bradley E.; Neilson, Jed J.; Shakespeare, Catherine; Williams, Christopher D.
作者单位:University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要:Regulation is often proposed, developed, and finalized over a lengthy rule-making period prior to its adoption. We examine the period over which banking authorities discussed, adopted, and implemented Basel III to understand how firms respond to proposed regulation. We find evidence to suggest that affected banks not only lobbied rule-makers against it but also made strategic financial reporting changes and altered their business models in ways that reduced their exposure to the proposed rule ...
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作者:Drake, Michael S.; Moon Jr, James R.; Warren, James D.
作者单位:Brigham Young University; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要:We employ a novel machine learning technique to classify analysts' forecast revisions into five types based on how the revision weighs publicly available signals. We label these forecast types as quant, sundry, contrarian, herder, and independent forecasts. Our tests reveal that a greater diversity of forecast types within the consensus is associated with increased consensus dispersion and improved consensus accuracy. Additionally, consensus diversity is associated with an improved information...
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作者:Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo
作者单位:University of Cologne; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
摘要:We study the profit effects and interplay of two core accounting practices in a field experiment in a large retail chain. In a 2 X 2 factorial design, we vary (1) whether store managers obtain decision-facilitating information on a profit metric and (2) whether they receive performance pay based on the same metric. We find that both practices increase profits significantly. In contrast to reasoning based on standard economic theory, we do not find complementarity between both interventions. Ra...
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作者:Jiang, Xu; Kanodia, Chandra; Zhang, Gaoqing
作者单位:Duke University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要:Corporate managers are often better informed than outside investors about the uncertain future benefits of investments. However, information about investment prospects is not verifiable and therefore not amenable to direct disclosure, but instead inferred by investors from other accounting disclosures. Given this situation, we study the normative question of how the market's perceptions of uncertainty and its beliefs about the expected level of future benefits of investment should factor into ...