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作者：Lyle, Matthew R.; Riedl, Edward J.; Siano, Federico
作者单位：Emory University; Boston University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper examines how changes in risk disclosures affect uncertainty about risk. We measure changes in risk disclosures using the addition and removal of individual risk factors to firms' 10-K filings, identified via textual analysis of the risk factors section. Our market outcome is the variance risk premium (VRP), which captures the market's pricing of uncertainty about firm risk. Following recent theoretical predictions, we predict and empirically document that newly disclosed signals of ...
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作者：Bushee, Brian J.; Taylor, Daniel J.; Zhu, Christina
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Although the shareholder benefits of investor conferences are well-documented, evidence on whether these conferences facilitate managerial opportunism is scarce. We examine whether managers opportunistically exploit heightened attention around the conference to hype the stock. We find that (1) managers increase the quantity of voluntary disclosure leading up to the conference, (2) these disclosures are more positive in tone and increase prices to a greater extent than post-conference disclosur...
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作者：Gallani, Susanna
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Can managers use monetary incentives to elicit cooperation from workers they cannot reward for their efforts? I study conduit incentives, an innovative incentive design, whereby managers influence bonus -ineligible workers' effort by offering bonus -eligible employees a monetary reward for performance that critically depends on the cooperation of the bonus-ineligible workers. Motivated by the reward, bonus-eligible employees use social motivators to elicit cooperation from their ineligible col...
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作者：Kubick, Thomas R.; Li, Yijun
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：We identify executives who have experienced significant accounting-related adverse events during their careers as a powerful setting to examine the extent to which prior professional experience can influence subsequent financial reporting policies. We find that firms led by senior financial executives who have experienced accounting-related adverse events during their careers exhibit greater unconditional accounting conservatism, a lower likelihood of experiencing future accounting-related adv...
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作者：Ecker, Frank; Francis, Jennifer; Olsson, Per; Schipper, Katherine
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Duke University
摘要：For a broad sample of firms, we use structural equations modeling to construct latent variables for realaction aggressiveness and reporting policy aggressiveness. We estimate the association between the latent variables and the associations of each latent variable with shareholder payoffs (returns) and CEO payoffs (annual compensation to the CEO position). Results show the two types of aggressiveness are positively correlated but have different associations with the payoffs we consider. Greate...
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作者：Kanodia, Chandra; Venugopalan, Raghu
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Houston Downtown
摘要：Corporate managers often express concern about accounting-induced volatility in financial statements. Accounting regulators, however, argue that the volatility in financial statements merely increases transparency by shining a light on risks that are inherent to the firm's business. We show that in many situations managerial concerns about volatility are justified because the information that is being provided actually magnifies rather than merely reflects the volatility in a firm's fundamenta...
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作者：Kim, Tae Wook; Li, Jing; Pae, Suil
作者单位：Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：A firm manager is concerned about both the firm value and the market assessments of his abilities. When investing in a project, he has private knowledge of his project-related ability that interacts with the project investment, and his general ability that produces a cash flow independent of the project cash flow. The concerns about the general (project-related) ability assessment create a signaling incentive to decrease (increase) investment. In the presence of underinvestment (overinvestment...
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作者：Garza, Brent A.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School
摘要：I examine inspector-auditor interactions and test proposed changes to the existing inspection process using a stylized experiment with real-effort and repeated interactions. I first show that when holding incentives constant, if inspectors perceive incentives to request additional audit work, they escalate their deficiency assessments and request more additional audit work. I then show that increasing inspector-auditor discussions before inspectors formally assess auditors' work tempers those ...
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作者：Chan, Derek K.; Liu, Nanqin
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Southern University of Science & Technology
摘要：We study the effects of the disclosure of critical audit matters (CAMs) on an auditor's audit effort and an investor's scrutiny effort decisions and on investment efficiency. Both the auditor and the investor can prevent a bad investment by respectively auditing and scrutinizing the firm's financial reports to detect misstatements about the investment value. Investment efficiency is determined by the investor's total mix of information. The disclosure of CAMs helps the investor assess investme...
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作者：Kim, Eunhee; Pae, Suil
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)
摘要：This paper presents a costly voluntary disclosure model in which the information quality of a signal about a firm's future cash flow is unknown, where the information quality, also called signal quality, refers to signal precision. Disclosure plays a dual role in firm valuation, providing information about both the cash flow and signal quality. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition under which the firm price under disclosure is a nonmonotonic and bounded function of the signal. Unde...
