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作者：Atanasov, Tyler
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：This paper presents a unifying model of disclosure in the presence of competitors and supply market reliance to examine the role of multisegment operations on disclosure choice. A firm's private information can have varying demand implications for its own portfolio of segments and for its competitors' portfolios of segments. In multisegment firms, cross-firm spillovers of information discourage disclosure whereas cross-segment spillovers encourage disclosure. This suggests multisegment firms w...
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作者：Timmermans, Oscar
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This study examines the risk taking properties associated with incentive plans that use relative performance evaluation, with a focus on the form of payout, whether in cash or shares. By analyzing determinants and consequences of payout form choice, I find that share-based plans offer risk-averse managers weaker incentives to pursue projects with idiosyncratic risk compared with cash plans. This occurs because share plans-unlike cash plans-expose managers to systematic performance trends, as p...
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作者：Ahn, Byung Hyun; Patatoukas, Panos N.; Skiadopoulos, George S.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of London; Queen Mary University London; University of Piraeus
摘要：Using SASB's materiality framework, prior research finds alpha for the portfolio of firms with improving ratings on material ESG issues. We replicate this finding and provide a fundamentals -based perspective on why the materiality portfolio outperforms. Our basic premise is that changes in material ESG issues reflect fundamental firm characteristics. More financially established firms-firms with larger size, lower growth, and higher profitability relative to their sector-are more likely to no...
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作者：Baber, William; Beck, Amanda; Koester, Allison
作者单位：Georgetown University; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB 34, 1999) standardized financial reporting and disclosure requirements for U.S. state and local governments. We interpret debt issuing patterns surrounding GASB 34 implementation as evidence of strategic behavior by governments in anticipation of GASB 34 consequences. Specifically, governments that expected more favorable post-GASB 34 evaluations by municipal bond investors delayed new uninsured debt issues until after, whereas gov...
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作者：Hoopes, Jeffrey L.; Langetieg, Patrick T.; Maydew, Edward L.; Mullaney, Michele S.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Drawing on confidential Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, we examine whether privately held corporations are more aggressive tax planners than their publicly held peers. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find no consistent evidence that private firms are more aggressive tax planners. We then examine whether private firms' tax planning differs from that of public firms more generally. We find that private firms engage in more conforming tax planning (planning that also reduces pretax accou...
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作者：Scherf, Alexandra A.
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Public corruption is a concern for democracies around the world. In the U.S., states have responded to this issue by publishing personal financial disclosures (PFDs) for public officials online. PFDs are a conflict -of -interest disclosure designed to relieve agency conflicts between private citizens and government officials by documenting overlaps between officials' financial interests and public responsibilities. This paper explores whether and how online PFD supports anticorruption enforcem...
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作者：Bonsall, Samuel B.; Holzman, Eric R.; Miller, Brian P.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We examine a comprehensive set of investigations by the SEC's Division of Enforcement offices to provide evidence on the consequences of these office's busyness on the formal investigation process. We find that higher office case backlog decreases the likelihood of an investigation into a restating firm. Our results show no evidence that higher backlogs affect the SEC's ability to pursue cases involving revenue recognition issues and high insider trading, which is consistent with the agency's ...
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作者：Garcia-Feijoo, Luis; Jensen, Tyler K.; Koch, Paul D.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida Atlantic University; Iowa State University
摘要：We document time -varying interrelations between aggregate funding conditions and the impact of operating leverage (OL) on stock returns. OL represents a primitive source of risk, which helps explain the well established unconditional relation between OL and future returns. However, the outperformance of firms with high OL occurs exclusively during periods of unconstrained funding. Although high OL represents operational inflexibility, when the Fed eases funding constraints, improved capital a...
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作者：Gross, Christian; Wagenhofer, Alfred; Windisch, David
作者单位：University of Graz; University of Amsterdam; University of Graz
摘要：We examine whether the design of a firm's internal management accounting system is associated with GAAP earnings management. We exploit the fact that ASC 280 mandates a management approach requiring multisegment firms to disclose their segment earnings as defined internally by their management accounting system. We posit that the less these segment earnings are decoupled from GAAP earnings, the higher are the costs of earnings management because earnings management spills over to segment earni...
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作者：Bloomfield, Matthew J.; Friedman, Henry L.; Kim, Hwa Young
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on revenue-based pay as a plausible channel through which institutional investors might influence competition. Our model implies a negative effect of common ownership on firms' use of revenue-based pay. Using ...
