The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure Dissemination on Information Asymmetry among Investors: Evidence from the Implementation of the EDGAR System

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gomez, Enrique A.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2020-0602
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 235-257
• 关键词: market liquidity; capital-markets; trading volume; cost; announcement; EFFICIENCY; frequency; FILINGS; IMPACT; trades

摘要

I study the effect of the implementation of the SEC's EDGAR system on information asymmetry among investors. The SEC adopted EDGAR to decrease acquisition costs of mandatory filings. However, disclosure theory suggests that, even when acquisition costs are low, integration costs (i.e., costs necessary to filter and interpret information signals) may be so high that less sophisticated investors are disadvantaged, relative to their sophisticated peers. Consistent with this theory, I find evidence that EDGAR increased information asymmetries among investors. This result is more pronounced for firms with higher integration costs-i.e., those with more complex filings and filings that have higher information content-as well as for firms with lower analyst coverage. Overall, my results suggest that, although EDGAR lowered acquisition costs for all investors, it also benefited some investors at the expense of others.