Journal of Accounting and Economics

最新文章

• Financial analysts' forecast revisions and managers' reporting behavior AI翻译
  作者：Beyer, Anne
  作者单位：Stanford University
  摘要：This paper studies an analyst's forecasting strategy and a manager's earnings management policy. When reporting earnings, the manager trades off the disutility he obtains from falling short of the analyst's forecast against the costs of manipulating earnings. The model predicts that: (i) the analyst's forecast exceeds median reported earnings; (ii) the analyst is more likely to revise his forecast downward than upward; (iii) mean and median forecast errors are larger in magnitude when the anal...
• Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism AI翻译
  作者：Chung, Hyeesoo H.; Wynn, Jinyoung R.
  作者单位：University of Louisiana System; Louisiana Technical University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Downtown Phoenix
  摘要：This paper examines the effect of managerial legal liability coverage on earnings conservatism. Using directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance coverage and cash for indemnification as a proxy for managerial legal liability coverage, we find that the higher the managerial liability coverage, which reduces the expected legal liability of managers, the less conservative the firm's earnings. We also find that managerial legal liability coverage has a stronger influence on earnings conser...
• The superiority and disciplining role of independent analysts AI翻译
  作者：Gu, Zhaoyang; Xue, Jian
  作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Tsinghua University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
  摘要：We show that although forecasts of independent analysts are less accurate ex post, they yield forecast errors that are more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns. This suggests that forecasts of independent analysts are superior to those of nonindependent analysts in representing ex ante market expectations. We also show that forecasts of nonindependent analysts become more accurate and less biased, and produce forecast errors more strongly associated with abnormal stock returns when...
• Did the 2003 Tax Act reduce the cost of equity capital? AI翻译
  作者：Dhaliwal, Dan; Krull, Linda; Li, Oliver Zhen
  作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Auckland; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Notre Dame
  摘要：The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduced shareholder-level taxes on equity income. If shareholder-level taxation is a component of cost of equity capital, then the cost of equity capital should decrease after the Tax Act. We find that the cost of equity capital decreases by 1.02% and that the decline is smaller for firms largely held by institutional investors to whom the tax rate reduction does not apply. These results suggest that the Tax Act lowered the cost of equi...
• Delisting returns and their effect on accounting-based market anomalies AI翻译
  作者：Beaver, William; McNichols, Maureen; Price, Richard
  作者单位：Stanford University; Rice University
  摘要：We show that tests of market efficiency are sensitive to the inclusion of delisting firm-years. When included, trading strategy returns based on anomaly variables can increase (for strategies based on earnings, cash flows and the book-to-market ratio) or decrease (for a strategy based on accruals). This is due to the disproportionate number of delisting firm-years in the lowest decile of these variables. Delisting firm-years are most often excluded because the researcher does not correctly inc...
• The effect of equity compensation on voluntary executive turnover AI翻译
  作者：Balsam, Steven; Miharjo, Setlyono
  作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Gadjah Mada University
  摘要：Equity compensation provides incentives for executives to remain with the firm to avoid forfeiture of restricted shares and some or all of the value of stock options held. Empirically we show that the intrinsic value of unexercisable in-the-money options, the time value of unexercised options, and the value of restricted shares are inversely related to voluntary executive turnover. These findings which are most pronounced for strong performers, hold for CEOs and non-CEOs alike. While paying ex...
• The roles of task-specific forecasting experience and innate ability in understanding analyst forecasting performance AI翻译
  作者：Clement, Michael B.; Koonce, Lisa; Lopez, Thomas J.
  作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia
  摘要：Considerable debate exists about what analyst experience measures and whether analysts learn from their experiences. Extant research has argued that once innate ability is considered, analysts' general and firm-specific experiences are not relevant to understanding their forecasting performance. We argue that measures of experience need to be expanded to also include task-specific experience. Our results reveal that analysts' forecast accuracy is associated with both their innate ability and t...
• Aggregate earnings, stock market returns and macroeconomic activity: A discussion of 'does earnings guidance affect market returns? The nature and information content of aggregate earnings guidance' AI翻译
  作者：Shivakumar, Lakshmanan
  作者单位：University of London; London Business School
  摘要：Anilowski, Feng and Skinner (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2006, this issue) examine the relationship between aggregate earnings guidance, aggregate earnings news and market returns. They provide evidence that changes in aggregate proportions of downward or upward earnings guidance are associated with aggregate earnings news and weakly associated with market returns. However, the study is unable to establish causality or the precise nature of the relationship between aggregate earnings ...
• The monitoring role of insiders AI翻译
  作者：Drymiotes, George
  作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
  摘要：Conventional wisdom suggests that giving monitored agents an oversight role may blunt the effectiveness of the monitoring process. In contrast, I show that less independent boards can sometimes be more effective at monitoring. Fully independent boards have incentives to shirk monitoring ex post, after the agents' productive inputs are sunk, if the boards cannot commit ex ante to monitoring. However, boards with inside directors may have incentives to monitor the agents ex post. The demand for ...
• Corporate disclosures by family firms AI翻译
  作者：Ali, Ashiq; Chen, Tai-Yuan; Radhakrishnan, Suresh
  作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
  摘要：Compared to non-family firms, family firms face less severe agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems that arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. These characteristics of family firms affect their corporate disclosure practices. For S&P 500 firms, we show that family firms report better quality earnings, are more likely to warn for a given magnitude of bad news, but make fewer disclosures about their corporate govern...