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作者：Gul, Ferdinand A.; Fung, Simon Yu Kit; Jaggi, Bikki
作者单位：Hong Kong Polytechnic University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：Prior Studies suggest that auditors with short tenure are associated with lower earnings quality because of the lack of client-specific knowledge and/or low balling. In this study, we examine whether industry specialization of auditors and low balling affect the association between auditor tenure and earnings quality. We find that the association between shorter auditor tenure and lower earnings quality is weaker for firms audited by industry specialists compared to non-specialists. In additio...
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作者：Rogers, Jonathan L.; Skinner, Douglas J.; Van Buskirk, Andrew
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We study the effect of disclosure on uncertainty by examining how management earnings forecasts affect stock market volatility. Using implied volatilities from exchange-traded options prices, we find that management earnings forecasts increase short-term volatility. This effect is attributable to forecasts that convey bad news, especially when firms release forecasts sporadically rather than on a routine basis. In the longer run, market uncertainty declines after earnings are announced, regard...
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作者：Altinkilic, Oya; Hansen, Robert S.
作者单位：Tulane University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We examine the information transmission role of stock recommendation revisions by sell-side security analysts. Revisions are associated with economically insignificant mean price reactions and often piggyback on recent news, events, long-term momentum, and short-run contrarian return predictors, typically downgrading after bad news and upgrading after good news. However, the revisions are usually information-free for investors. The findings go against the long-standing view that recommendation...
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作者：Hanlon, Michelle; Maydew, Edward L.; Shevlin, Terry
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Increasing the conformity between accounting earnings and taxable income has been proposed to improve financial reporting and curtail aggressive tax planning. We find, however, that increasing conformity results in earnings that are less informative. Our inquiry exploits a unique sample of firms forced to change from the cash method to the accrual method for tax purposes, thereby increasing their book-tax conformity. We find that these firms experienced a decrease in earnings informativeness c...
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作者：Gong, Guojin; Louis, Henock; Sun, Amy X.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：There is a positive association between stock-for-stock acquirers' pre-merger abnormal accruals and post-merger announcement lawsuits. The market only partially anticipates the effects of post-merger announcement lawsuits at the merger announcement and the post-merger announcement long-term market underperformance is largely limited to litigated acquisitions. Overall, the evidence suggests that it is important that investors not only undo the direct stock price effects of earnings management b...
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作者：Blacconiere, Walter G.; Johnson, Marilyn F.; Lewis, Melissa F.
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We show that firms wit h executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is that the firm will expense SOC. CEOs Of qualified firms that also expense SOC receive smaller bonuses than CEOs of expensing firms that are not qualified under 162(m), and the lower 162(m) bonuses are no...
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作者：Robinson, Leslie A.; Sansing, Richard
作者单位：Dartmouth College; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper develops and analyzes a model in which tax considerations and financial reporting considerations have countervailing effects on a firm's investments in internally developed intangible assets. It also proposes and estimates a new measure of tax preferences, which we call the economic effective tax rate. This measure reflects both investments in intangible assets and the use of bebt financing, neither of which generates a book-tax difference. Our measure indicates that the economic ef...
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作者：Langberg, Nisan; Sivaramakrishnan, K.
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：We analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. We derive all equilibrium ill which Managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. We show that analysts cover good news disclosures with higher scrutiny. To the extent analysts rely on mandatory financial reports to interpret Voluntary disclosures, we show that more precise financial report...
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作者：Arnalz, Oscar Gutierrez; Salas-Fumas, Vicente
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zaragoza
摘要：This paper analyzes incentive design when agents' effort influences an uncertain output governed by a random process with semi-heavy tails. We find that the second-best incentive contract pays an output-increasing but bounded fee with a shape resembling performance-standard contracts that pay a fixed salary plus a capped bonus. In this contract, the pay-performance sensitivity around the standard increases (decreases) with the frequency with which performance is measured and with the kurtosis ...
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作者：Daniel, Naveen D.; Denis, David J.; Naveen, Lalitha
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Drexel University
摘要：Dividend-paying firms tend to manage earnings upward when their earnings would otherwise fall short of expected dividend levels. This behavior is evident only in firms with positive debt and is more aggressive prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, subsequent to the 2003 dividend tax cut, in high-payout firms, in firms whose CEOs receive higher dollar dividends and have higher pay-performance sensitivities, and in firms that raise less outside equity. Moreover, this earnings management behavior appe...
