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作者：Samuels, Delphine; Taylor, Daniel J.; Verrecchia, Robert E.
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper examines how the ex ante level of public scrutiny influences a manager's subsequent decision to misreport. The conventional wisdom is that high levels of public scrutiny facilitate monitoring, suggesting a negative relation between scrutiny and misreporting. However, public scrutiny also increases the weight that investors place on earnings in valuing the firm. This in turn increases the benefit of misreporting, suggesting a positive relation. We formalize these two countervailing f...
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作者：Bloomfield, Matthew; Gipper, Brandon; Kepler, John D.; Tsui, David
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University; University of Southern California
摘要：Executive bonus plans often incorporate performance measures that exclude particular costsda practice we refer to as cost shielding. We predict that boards use cost shielding to mitigate underinvestment and insulate new managers from the costs of prior execu-tives' decisions. We find evidence that boards use cost shielding to deter underinvestment in intangibles and encourage managers to take advantage of growth opportunities. We also find that cost shielding tends to be elevated for newly-hir...
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作者：Mao, Yifei
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：Using exogenous variations in the market value of corporate real estate, this paper investigates whether appreciation of corporate collateral value facilitates innovation. My baseline finding shows that real estate appreciation leads to an increase in innovation quantity as measured by patent productions and in innovation quality as measured by citations per patent, especially when firms are credit constrained. To uncover the underlying channel, I show that real estate appreciation allows addi...
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作者：Heese, Jonas; Perez-Cavazos, Gerardo
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We use large increases in unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to study the effects of expected retaliation costs on employee whistleblowing. Increases in UI benefits reduce the costs that arise from a job loss, one of the costliest forms of retaliation. We find that increases in UI benefits increase the number of facility-level employee workplace safety complaints filed with the regulator. Furthermore, UI benefit increases also result in more violations and more penalties. The effects are con...
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作者：Kepler, John D.
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：I study how private communication among competitors affects their public disclosures. Theory suggests that competing firms can use public disclosure to coordinate, and predicts less public disclosure when there is more private communication. Using data on strategic alliances, I predict and find that firms that enter strategic alliances with competitors reduce their public disclosure, and that the reduction is more pronounced for alliances that allow for more private communication. ? 2021 Elsev...
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作者：Nagar, Venky; Schoenfeld, Jordan
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Dartmouth College
摘要：Theories of delegated monitoring predict that when public disclosure is costly, monitoring by a large investor leads management to supply more private information to that investor, and less public disclosure to other similarly aligned investors who free-ride off the monitor. We test this prediction in the setting where large shareholders contractually bind management to share private information. We find that after the execution of such contracts, firms improve their performance and reduce the...
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作者：Dey, Aiyesha; White, Joshua T.
作者单位：Harvard University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：How do firms protect their human capital? We test whether firms facing an increased threat of being acquired strengthen their antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in order to bond with their employees. We use the adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts, which exogenously decreases knowledge-worker mobility, thus elevating takeover risk and reducing employee incentives to innovate. Firms respond to the IDD adoption by strengthening ATPs that defend against hostile take...
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作者：Kang, Jung Koo; Loumioti, Maria; Wittenberg-Moerman, Regina
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Southern California
摘要：We explore whether the introduction of transparent reporting rules increases credit standard harmonization within a bank. We exploit the new loan-level reporting rules imposed on banks that borrow from the European Central Bank using repurchase agreements collateralized by their asset-backed securities. We compare credit terms of similar mortgages issued by a bank across a country's regions and find that harmonization increases following the adoption of the new reporting rules. Learning and re...
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作者：Dong, Yashu; Young, Danqing
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This study examines information transfer regarding how investors react to new foreign macroeconomic and industry-related information embedded in foreign firms' earnings releases. Using non-U.S. firms listed in the U.S. as our main setting, we find that U.S. investors react significantly to foreign macroeconomic information and to information generated by the interaction between macroeconomic and industry-related information. We also find that the benefits (costs) of processing earnings reports...
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作者：Herpfer, Christoph
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：I construct a novel dataset of individual bankers in the U.S. syndicated loan market to analyze the impact of bankers for the largest, most transparent borrowers. Bankers exhibit time-invariant preferences for specific loan characteristics, or styles. In addition, exploiting within-borrower variation in personal relationship strength from banker turnover, I find that stronger relationships lead to significantly lower interest rates. This effect is stronger if borrowers lack a credit rating or ...
