Shareholder monitoring and discretionary disclosure*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nagar, Venky; Schoenfeld, Jordan
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Dartmouth College
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101422
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: regulation fair disclosure; HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM; corporate governance; information asymmetry; institutional investors; voluntary disclosure; Ownership structure; private meetings; Textual analysis; REGULATION FD

摘要

Theories of delegated monitoring predict that when public disclosure is costly, monitoring by a large investor leads management to supply more private information to that investor, and less public disclosure to other similarly aligned investors who free-ride off the monitor. We test this prediction in the setting where large shareholders contractually bind management to share private information. We find that after the execution of such contracts, firms improve their performance and reduce their public disclosures. Overall, our evidence supports the disclosure prediction of delegated monitoring theories, and is inconsistent with poor-performance and expropriation theories of disclosure. 0 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).