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作者：Armstrong, Christopher; Blackburne, Terrence; Quinn, Phillip
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Oregon State University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Little is known about why CEOs voluntarily purchase shares of their firm other than to earn direct profits. Since CEOs are risk-averse, undiversified, and face litigation costs from trading on private information, direct profits are unlikely to be the sole motive-especially since many purchases are ultimately unprofitable. We find that CEOs who have recently purchased shares are less likely to be terminated following poor performance and that this relation varies predictably with (i) their cos...
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作者：Stephan, Andrew P.; Walther, Beverly R.; Wellman, Laura A.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This study investigates whether brokerage houses appear to provide stock tips to politicians. Our results indicate that trades by politicians who are politically connected to the brokerage house where the trade is executed are more profitable. Our estimates suggest that these connected trades earn an incremental 0.3% over a five-day window relative to the politician's average profitability. Given the average number of trades our sample politicians execute in a year, the 0.3% return per trade t...
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作者：Versano, Tsahi
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Most information that public firms are required to disclose is relatively hard (e.g., historical information), whereas the disclosure of relevant information that is softer in nature (e.g., forward-looking information) is typically left to firms' discretion. The lack of a mandatory requirement to disclose soft information has been at the heart of a number of on-going accounting debates. This study shows that while mandating disclosure increases the fre-quency of disclosure, it results in a red...
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作者：Heese, Jonas; Krishnan, Ranjani; Ramasubramanian, Hari
作者单位：Harvard University; Michigan State University
摘要：We examine drivers and consequences of U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of whistleblower cases of corporate fraud against the government. We find that the DOJ is more likely to intervene in and conduct longer investigations of cases that have a higher chance of victory and yield greater monetary proceeds, indicating that DOJ enforcement is influenced by its performance measures. DOJ intervention also affects the firm- and aggregate-level fraud environment. Firms subject to DOJ interv...
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作者：Dyer, Travis A.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：I examine the demand for public information by local and nonlocal investors. Using novel data on institutional investors' requests for financial information from the SEC, I document that investors acquire approximately 20% more financial information for their local investments. This pattern holds after controlling for investors' 13(f) portfolio holdings. I further demonstrate that this pattern is concentrated in stocks eliciting behavioral biases as well as among investors with strong company ...
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作者：Bernard, Darren; Kaya, Devrimi; Wertz, John
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Ruhr University Bochum
摘要：Little explains firms' capital structure decisions better than peer firms' capital structure decisions. Empirical work suggests that such ?mimicking? arises not only because firms share exposure to institutional environments, industry conditions, and other common factors, but also because financing decisions are direct functions of peers? decisions (e.g., Leary and Roberts, 2014; Frank and Goyal, 2009). Possible reasons for mimicking range from agency and reputation incentives (e.g., Scharfste...
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作者：DeHaan, Ed; Song, Yang; Xie, Chloe; Zhu, Christina
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Mutual funds hold 32% of the U.S. equity market and comprise 58% of retirement savings, yet retail investors consistently make poor choices when selecting funds. Theory suggests poor choices are partially due to fund managers creating unnecessarily complex disclo-sures and fee structures to keep investors uninformed and obfuscate poor performance. An empirical challenge in investigating this strategic obfuscation theory is isolating manipulated complexity from complexity arising from inherent ...
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作者：Beardsley, Erik L.; Robinson, John R.; Wong, Paul A.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：Kirk, Reppenhagen, and Tucker (2014) find that investors use individual analyst forecasts as additional earnings benchmarks. We investigate whether executives manage earnings to beat these individual benchmarks. Using year-end effective tax rate (ETR) manipulation as our setting, we find that firms decrease ETRs from 3rd to 4th quarter to meet or beat a greater percentage of individual forecasts. We also find some evidence that firms use incremental ETR changes to meet forecasts by key analyst...
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作者：Amel-Zadeh, Amir; Barth, Mary E.
作者单位：University of Oxford; Stanford University
摘要：We discuss Economic Consequences of Mandatory Auditor Reporting to Bank Regulators by Balakrishnan, De George, Ertan, and Scobie (BDES, in this issue). BDES concludes that a key benefit of mandatory auditor reporting to bank regulators is reduced bank risk, and its costs include reduced profitability from less overall and less risky lending, and higher audit costs. BDES also provides evidence on the channels through which mandatory auditor reporting links to reduced bank risk. We scrutinize BD...
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作者：Lampenius, Niklas; Shevlin, Terry; Stenzel, Arthur
作者单位：University Hohenheim; University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of St Gallen
摘要：We develop an approach based on publicly available data to decompose and quantify tax avoidance into two separate components: tax rate avoidance and tax base avoidance. Our measures are based on the average statutory tax rate, which accounts for the statutory tax rates across all transactions of a firm. We illustrate and validate our measures using simulation data, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, changes in tax rate avoidance and tax base avoidance across time, b...
