The role of bankers in the US syndicated loan market*

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herpfer, Christoph
• 署名单位: Emory University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101383
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: private information; Managers; style; MODEL

摘要

I construct a novel dataset of individual bankers in the U.S. syndicated loan market to analyze the impact of bankers for the largest, most transparent borrowers. Bankers exhibit time-invariant preferences for specific loan characteristics, or styles. In addition, exploiting within-borrower variation in personal relationship strength from banker turnover, I find that stronger relationships lead to significantly lower interest rates. This effect is stronger if borrowers lack a credit rating or issue less frequent and shorter horizon management reports. Relationship loans are associated with fewer bankruptcies and fewer favorable modifications in renegotiations. 0 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.