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作者：Chen, Ningyuan; Gallego, Guillermo
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Dynamic pricing is designed to increase the revenues or profits of firms by adjusting prices in response to changes in the marginal value of capacity. We examine the impact of dynamic pricing on social welfare and consumers' surplus. We present a dynamic pricing formulation designed to maximize welfare and show that the welfare-maximizing dynamic pricing policy has the same structural properties as the revenue-maximizing policy. For systems with scarce capacity, we show that the revenue-maximi...
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作者：Guan, Yuyan; Li, Congcong; Lu, Hai; Wong, M. H. Franco
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Duquesne University; University of Toronto; Peking University
摘要：The Global Settlement, along with related regulations in the early 2000s, prohibits the use of investment banking revenue to fund equity research and compensate equity analysts. We find that all-star analysts from investment banks are more likely to exit the profession or move to the buy side after the regulations. The departed star analysts' earnings revisions and stack recommendations are more informative than those of the remaining analysts who followed the same companies. To the extent tha...
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作者：Horton, John J.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Employers in an online labor market often pursue workers with little capacity to take on more work. The pursuit of low-capacity workers is consequential, as these workers are more likely to reject employer inquires, causing a reduction in the probability that a job opening is ultimately filled. In an attempt to shift more employer attention to workers with greater capacity, the market-designing platform examined in this paper introduced a new signaling feature into the market. It was effective...
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作者：Lambert, Thomas
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：This paper analyzes the relationship between bank lobbying and supervisory decisions of regulators and documents its moral hazard implications. Exploiting bank-level information on the universe of commercial and savings banks in the United States, I find that regulators are 44.7% less likely to initiate enforcement actions against lobbying banks. This result is robust across measures of lobbying and accounts for endogeneity concerns by employing instrumental variables strategies. In addition, ...
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作者：Huang, Yilin; Nadauld, Taylor D.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Brigham Young University
摘要：When a firm is facing default, equity holders have incentives to engage in asset substitution, underinvest, or directly transfer wealth. Few papers document investment distortions on account of debt-equity agency conflicts, only that the threat of distortions influence ex ante financing costs. A nonagency residential mortgage-backed security deal represents an entity that is highly leveraged where, ex ante, equity holders know they will face default. This provides an ideal laboratory for testi...
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作者：Bommier, Antoine; Le Grand, Francois
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; emlyon business school; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We study the saving behavior of infinitely long-lived agents who face income uncertainty and deterministic interest rates. Using monotone recursive preferences, we prove that risk aversion unambiguously increases savings. The result accounts for possibly binding borrowing constraints and holds for very general specification of income uncertainty, which can follow any kind of stochastically monotone process.
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作者：Carpena, Fenella; Cole, Shawn; Shapiro, Jeremy; Zia, Bilal
作者单位：Harvard University; The World Bank
摘要：This paper uses a large-scale field experiment in India to study attitudinal, behavioral, and cognitive constraints that can stymie the link between financial education and financial outcomes. The study complements financial education with (i) financial incentives on a financial literacy test to affect participant motivation, (ii) financial goal setting to provide a psychological nudge, and (iii) personalized financial counseling to enhance the intensity of treatment. The analysis finds no imp...
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作者：Chen, Yiwei; Ozer, Ozalp
作者单位：University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This paper determines categories of contracts that facilitate vertical information sharing in a supply chain while precluding horizontal information leakage among competing newsvendors. We consider a supply chain in which retailers replenish inventory from a common supplier to satisfy uncertain demand and are engaged in newsvendor competition. Each retailer has imperfect demand information. Yet one of the retailers (the incumbent) has a more accurate demand forecast than the other (the entrant...
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作者：Chiang, Yao-Min; Lowry, Michelle; Qian, Yiming
作者单位：National Taiwan University; Drexel University; University of Iowa
摘要：Using a unique data set of dealer-level trading data in bookbuilding initial public offerings (IPOs), we find strong evidence that lead underwriter trades in IPO firms are significantly related to subsequent IPO abnormal returns. This relation is concentrated among issues in which underwriters' information advantage is likely greater, specifically among IPOs with higher information asymmetry or subject to higher investor sentiment and among underwriters with the most industry experience. In co...
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作者：Buterin, Vitalik; Hitzig, Zoe; Weyl, E. Glen
作者单位：Harvard University; Microsoft
摘要：We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from quadratic voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Citizens make contributions to public goods of value to them. The amount received by the public good is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the standard model, this mechani...
