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作者：Wu, Lynn; Jin, Fujie; Hitt, Lorin M.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：This study examines how characteristics of an interfirm labor-flow network affect firm productivity. Using employee job histories to trace labor movement between organizations, we construct labor-flow networks for both information technology (IT) and non-IT labor and analyze how a firm's network structure for the two types of labor affects its performance. We find that hiring IT workers from a structurally diverse network of firms can substantially improve firm productivity, but that the same ...
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作者：Atasoy, Hilal; Chen, Pei-yu; Ganju, Kartik
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; McGill University
摘要：Electronic health records (EHR) are often presumed to reduce the significant and accelerating healthcare costs in the United States. However, evidence on the relationship between EHR adoption and costs is mixed, leading to skepticism about the effectiveness of EHR in decreasing costs. We argue that simply looking at the hospital-level effects can be misleading because the benefits of EHR can go beyond the adopting hospital by creating regional spillovers via information and patient sharing. Wh...
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作者：Burtch, Gordon; Hong, Yili; Bapna, Ravi; Griskevicius, Vladas
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：In hopes of motivating consumers to provide larger volumes of useful reviews, many retailers offer financial incentives. Here, we explore an alternative approach, social norms. We inform individuals about the volume of reviews authored by peers. We test the effectiveness of using financial incentives, social norms, and a combination of both strategies in motivating consumers. In two randomized experiments, one in the field conducted in partnership with a large online clothing retailer based in...
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作者：Chellappa, Ramnath K.; Mehra, Amit
作者单位：Emory University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：In this paper, we extend the understanding of versioning strategy of an information goods monopolist and provide new insights on when versioning is optimal. To do so, we derive the optimal product line or versions of an information good and the corresponding prices. By relaxing common assumptions on consumers' usage costs, versioning costs and capital research and development costs, we provide new insights as well as reconcile extant findings on versioning. For a good with no-free-disposal (NF...
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作者：Papanastasiou, Yiangos; Bimpikis, Kostas; Savva, Nicos
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Motivated by the proliferation of online platforms that collect and disseminate consumers' experiences with alternative substitutable products/ services, we investigate the problem of optimal information provision when the goal is to maximize aggregate consumer surplus. We develop a decentralized multiarmed bandit framework where a forward- looking principal (the platform designer) commits up front to a policy that dynamically discloses information regarding the history of outcomes to a series...
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作者：Kim, E. Han; Lu, Yao
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University
摘要：The executive suite and the board are closely bound to each other through their fiduciary responsibility to the same shareholders. With chief executive officers' (CEOs) prominent role in both governing bodies, their independence from CEOs' self-serving behavior might be related to each other. We explore the interdependence using an external shock increasing board independence. The shock weakens executive suite independence by increasing CEO connectedness within executive suites through appoint...
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作者：Serpa, Juan Camilo; Krishnan, Harish
作者单位：McGill University; University of British Columbia
摘要：Firms in a vertical relationship are likely to affect each other's productivity. Exactly how does productivity spill over across this type of relationship (i.e., through which mechanisms)? Additionally, how does the relative importance of these mechanisms depend on the structure of the supply chain? To answer these questions, we decompose the channels of upstream productivity spillovers-from customers to suppliers-by developing a structural econometric model on a sample of approximately 22,500...
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作者：Hooshangi, Soheil; Loewenstein, George
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：Using a novel experimental paradigm, we explore how the experience of generating an idea and the possibility that another investor might adopt a rejected investment opportunity, bias the investment decisions of innovator and imitator entrepreneurs. We find that individuals who generate a business idea form biased evaluations of the economic potential of ideas, be it their own idea or somebody else's idea. On the one hand, they are overconfident about the value of, and overly likely to invest i...
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作者：Tunca, Tunay I.; Zhu, Weiming
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：Small suppliers often face challenges to obtain financing for their operations. Especially in developing economies, traditional financing methods can be very costly or unavailable to such suppliers. To reduce channel costs, large buyers have recently begun implementing their own financing methods that intermediate between suppliers and financing institutions. In this paper, we analyze the role and efficiency of buyer intermediation in supplier financing. Building a game-theoretical model, we s...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey; Robbett, Andrea; Akbar, Prottoy A.
作者单位：Middlebury College; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Despite the 1/N problem associated with profit sharing, the empirical literature finds that sharing profits with workers has a positive impact on work team and firm performance. We examine one possible resolution to this puzzle by observing that, although the incentive to work harder under profit sharing is weak, it might be sufficient to motivate workers to report each other for shirking, especially if the workers are reciprocally minded. Our model provides the rationale for this conjecture, ...
