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作者：Lu, Yixin; Gupta, Alok; Ketter, Wolfgang; van Heckd, Eric
作者单位：George Washington University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Cologne; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：One of the central issues in auction design is how much information should be disclosed to bidders. In this paper, we examine bidder's identity disclosure in sequential business-to-business (B2B) auctions. Specifically, we compare two information disclosure policies, one that publicly discloses winners' identities (the status quo) and an alternative policy that conceals winners' identities. Using a large-scale field experiment in the Dutch flower auction market, we find that concealing winners...
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作者：Savva, Nicos; Tezcan, Tolga; Yildiz, Ozlem
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Virginia
摘要：Yardstick competition is a regulatory scheme for local monopolists (e.g., hospitals), where the monopolist's reimbursement is linked to performance relative to other equivalent monopolists. This regulatory scheme is known to provide cost-reduction incentives and serves as the theoretical underpinning behind the hospital prospective reimbursement system used throughout the developed world. This paper uses a game-theoretic queueing model to investigate how yardstick competition performs in servi...
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作者：Sun, Tianshu; Gao, Guodong (Gordon); Jin, Ginger Zhe
作者单位：University of Southern California; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, we use mobile messaging to leverage recipients' social ties and encourage offline prosocial activities in groups. In particular, we conduct a randomized field experiment with 80,000 blood donors and study how behavioral interventions and economic rewards motivate offline group formation. We find that two commonly used interventions-reminder messages and individual reward-are ineffective in motivating group formation because they do not compensate donors for the cost of bringing ...
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作者：Camerer, Colin F.; Nave, Gideon; Smith, Alec
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Pennsylvania; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We study dynamic unstructured bargaining with deadlines and one-sided private information about the amount available to share (the pie size). Using mechanism design theory, we show that given the players' incentives, the equilibrium incidence of bargaining failures (strikes) should increase with the pie size, and we derive a condition under which strikes are efficient. In our setting, no equilibrium satisfies both equality and efficiency in all pie sizes. We derive two equilibria that resolve ...
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作者：Castiglionesi, Fabio; Feriozzi, Fabio; Lorenzoni, Guido
作者单位：Tilburg University; IE University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of financial integration on the stability of the banking system. Financial integration allows banks in different regions to smooth local liquidity shocks by borrowing and lending on a world interbank market. We show under which conditions financial integration induces banks to reduce their liquidity holdings and to shift their portfolios toward more profitable but less liquid investments. Integration helps reallocate liquidity when different banks are hit by unc...
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作者：Chan, Timothy C. Y.; Lee, Taewoo; Terekhov, Daria
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Houston System; University of Houston; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：In classical inverse linear optimization, one assumes that a given solution is a candidate to be optimal. Real data are imperfect and noisy, so there is no guarantee that this assumption is satisfied. Inspired by regression, this paper presents a unified framework for cost function estimation in linear optimization comprising a general inverse optimization model and a corresponding goodness-of-fit metric. Although our inverse optimization model is nonconvex, we derive a closed-formsolution and...
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作者：Wang, Pengfei; Jensen, Michael
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This study focuses on the market identities of firms and suggests that identity ambiguity is caused not only by bridging horizontal product categories but also by status inconsistency stemming from bridging vertical status categories. Focusing specifically on how firms reduce status inconsistency by restructuring their business portfolios, we argue that status inconsistency motivates firms to divest business units to present a more coherent vertical market identity. Emphasizing the interplay b...
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作者：Baardman, Lennart; Cohen, Maxime C.; Panchamgam, Kiran; Perakis, Georgia; Segev, Danny
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); New York University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Haifa
摘要：In addition to setting price discounts, retailers need to decide how to schedule promotion vehicles, such as flyers and TV commercials. Unlike the promotion pricing problem that received great attention from both academics and practitioners, the promotion vehicle scheduling problem was largely overlooked, and our goal is to study this problem both theoretically and in practice. We model the problem of scheduling promotion vehicles to maximize profits as a nonlinear bipartite matching-type prob...
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作者：Bandi, Chaithanya; Han, Eojin; Nohadani, Omid
作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
摘要：We introduce a new class of adaptive policies called periodic-affine policies, which allows a decision maker to optimally manage and control large-scale newsvendor networks in the presence of uncertain demand without distributional assumptions. These policies are data-driven and model many features of the demand such as correlation and remain robust to parameter misspecification. We present a model that can be generalized to multiproduct settings and extended to multiperiod problems. This is a...
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作者：Di Maggio, Marco; Kermani, Amir; Korgaonkar, Sanket
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We exploit the preemption of national banks from state laws against predatory lending by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) as a quasi-experiment to study the effect of deregulation and its interaction with competition on the supply of complex mortgages. Following the preemption ruling, national banks significantly increased their origination of loans with prepayment penalties relative to national banks in states without anti-predatory-lending laws. We highlight a competition ...
