A Flexible Design for Funding Public Goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Buterin, Vitalik; Hitzig, Zoe; Weyl, E. Glen
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Microsoft
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3337
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 5171-5187
• 关键词: Public goods; free-rider problem; mechanism design

摘要

We propose a design for philanthropic or publicly funded seeding to allow (near) optimal provision of a decentralized, self-organizing ecosystem of public goods. The concept extends ideas from quadratic voting to a funding mechanism for endogenous community formation. Citizens make contributions to public goods of value to them. The amount received by the public good is (proportional to) the square of the sum of the square roots of contributions received. Under the standard model, this mechanism yields first best public goods provision. Variations can limit the cost, help protect against collusion, and aid coordination. We discuss applications to campaign finance and highlight directions for future analysis and experimentation.