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作者：Cascio, Elizabeth U.; Lewis, Ethan G.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We explore how permanent residency affects personal income tax participation and net personal income tax payments using variation from the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which authorized the largest U.S. amnesty to date. We exploit the timing and geographic unevenness of IRCA's legalization programs alongside newly digitized data on personal income taxes in California, home to the majority of applicants. Green Cards induced the previously unauthorized to file state income t...
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作者：Menkhoff, Lukas; Miethe, Jakob
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung
摘要：Recent efforts to reduce international tax evasion focus on information exchange with tax havens. Using bilateral bank data for 1397 countrypairs in a balanced quarterly panel from 2003:1 to 2017:1V, we first show that information-on-request treaties with tax havens reduce bank deposits in tax havens by 27.5%. Second, also deposits from tax havens in high tax countries decline after such treaties are signed, giving authorities a second angle to detect tax evasion. Both reactions dissipate over...
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作者：Bostashvili, David; Ujhelyi, Gergely
作者单位：Amazon.com; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：We study political budget cycles in infrastructure spending that are conditional on bureaucratic organization. Bureaucrats can facilitate or hinder politicians' ability to engage in voter-friendly spending around elections. To test this idea, we use civil service reforms undertaken by US states in the second half of the 20th century to study political budget cycles in highway spending under civil service and patronage. We find that under patronage, highway spending is 12% higher in election ye...
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作者：Matsushima, Noriaki; Shinohara, Ryusuke
作者单位：University of Osaka; Hosei University
摘要：A profit-maximizing public good supplier endogenously determines the level of the public good and simultaneously negotiates with beneficiaries of the good one by one. A pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of beneficiaries' preferences. With the commitment, the supplier produces the public good at an efficient level in equilibrium if and only if its bargaining power is sufficiently weak. In addition, the public good ...
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作者：Griffith, Rachel; O'Connell, Martin; Smith, Kate
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Manchester; University of London; University College London
摘要：Alcohol consumption generates negative externalities that are non-linear in the total amount of alcohol consumed. If tastes for products are heterogeneous and correlated with marginal externalities, then varying tax rates on different products can lead to welfare gains. We study this problem in an optimal tax framework and empirically for the UK market. We find that heavy drinkers have systematically different patterns of alcohol demands and welfare gains from optimally varying rates are highe...
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作者：Scott-Clayton, Judith; Zafar, Basit
作者单位：Columbia University Teachers College; Columbia University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Prior research has demonstrated that financial aid can influence both college enrollments and completions, but less is known about its post-college consequences. This study is the first to link college and financial aid information to credit bureau data later in life, enabling us to examine the impacts of grant aid on homeownership, neighborhood characteristics, and credit outcomes. We use a regression-discontinuity (RD) strategy to identify causal effects of the WV PROMISE scholarship, a broa...
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作者：Bajo-Buenestado, Raul; Angel Borrella-Mas, Miguel
作者单位：University of Navarra; Rice University
摘要：Does the tax pass-through effect go beyond borders? We use firm-level prices to analyze the incidence of a tax change on firms on different sides of a border in an industry with differentiated firms selling a homogeneous product. By using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that firms' tax responses are consistent with predicted firms' best-responses. We show that the effect of the tax change was even greater after a politician publicly asked his fellow citizens to avoid crossing the...
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作者：Ohrn, Eric; Seegert, Nathan
作者单位：Grinnell College; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：When capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than dividends, the difference in rates creates a tax discount on mergers and acquisitions. The intuition is that if a target firm's assets are subject to the higher dividend tax rate, but the proceeds from the sale of these assets are taxed at the lower capital gains rate, there is a tax preference to be acquired. Using quasi-experimental variation created by the Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, we show that this tax discount ...
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作者：Goulder, Lawrence H.; Hafstead, Marc A. C.; Kim, GyuRim; Long, Xianling
作者单位：Stanford University; Resources for the Future; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper assesses the impacts across U.S. household income groups of carbon taxes of various designs. We consider both the source-side impacts (reflecting how policies affect wage, capital, and transfer incomes) as well as the use-side impacts (reflecting how policies alter the prices of goods and services purchased by households). We apply an integrated general equilibrium framework with extended measures of the source- and use-side impacts that add up to the overall welfare impact. Our res...
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作者：Fang, Hanming; Gu, Quanlin; Zhou, Li-An
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Central University of Finance & Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research; Peking University; ShanghaiTech University
摘要：Using a large, unique dataset on the Chinese housing market, we propose to measure the value of rents associated with government power using the price differences paid by bureaucrat buyers and non-bureaucrat buyers in the housing market. We find that the housing price paid by bureaucrat buyers is significantly lower than non-bureaucrat buyers, after controlling for a full set of characteristics of buyers, houses and mortgage loans. More importantly, we find that the bureaucrat price discounts ...
