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作者：Netzer, Nick; Scheuer, Florian
作者单位：University of Zurich; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We construct an extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. It allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract offers have been observed. We show that a subgame perfect equilibrium always exists. In fact, when withdrawal is costless, the set of equilibrium outcomes may correspond to the entire set of feasible contracts. We then focus on robust e...
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作者：Gemici, Ahu; Wiswall, Matthew
作者单位：New York University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Although women in the United States now complete more college degrees than men, the distribution of college majors among college graduates remains unequal, with women about two-thirds as likely as men to major in business or science. We develop and estimate a dynamic, overlapping generations model of human capital investments and labor supply. We allow for specific college major choices, instead of aggregating these choices to the education level. Results show that changes in skill prices, hig...
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作者：Chen, Ying; Olszewski, Wojciech
作者单位：University of Southampton; Johns Hopkins University; Northwestern University
摘要：Do elementary statistics or equilibrium theory deliver any insight regarding how we should argue in debates? We provide an answer in a model in which each discussant wants to convince the audience that a specific state holds. If the discussants' payoffs in the audience's posterior are concave above and convex below the prior and exhibit loss aversion, then the leading discussant should give precedence to the weaker argument, and the follower should respond to a weak argument weakly and to a st...
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作者：Azrieli, Yaron; Kim, Semin
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; National Taiwan University
摘要：We consider the design of decision rules in an environment with two alternatives, independent private values and no monetary transfers. The utilitarian rule subject to incentive compatibility constraints is a weighted majority rule, where agents' weights correspond to expected gains given that their favorite alternative is chosen. It is shown that a rule is interim incentive efficient if and only if it is a weighted majority rule, and we characterize those weighted majority rules that are ex a...
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作者：Friedberg, Leora; Stern, Steven
作者单位：University of Virginia
摘要：We use data on people's valuations of options outside marriage and beliefs about spouses' options. The data demonstrate that, in some couples, one spouse would be happier and the other spouse unhappier outside of some marriages, suggesting that bargaining takes place and that spouses have private information. We estimate a bargaining model with interdependent utility that quantifies the resulting inefficiencies. Our results show that people forgo some utility in order to make their spouses bet...
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作者：Strulik, Holger
作者单位：University of Gottingen
摘要：This article proposes a theory for the gradual evolution of knowledge diffusion and growth over the very long run. A feedback mechanism between capital accumulation and the ease of knowledge diffusion explains a long epoch of stasis and an epoch of high growth linked by a gradual economic takeoff. The feedback mechanism can explain the Great Divergence, the failure of less developed countries to attract capital from abroad, and the productivity slowdown. An extension toward a two-region world ...
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作者：Yenokyan, Karine; Seater, John J.; Arabshahi, Maryam
作者单位：Nazarbayev University; North Carolina State University
摘要：We study the world trading equilibrium in a Ricardian model, where factors of production are produced and traded. Even in the absence of technology transfer, international investment, research and development, and aggregate scale effects, trade affects economic growth through comparative advantage. Trade may raise the growth rate or leave it unchanged, depending on the patterns of comparative and absolute advantage. Trade in factors of production can effectively equalize technology even when t...
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作者：Pakes, Ariel
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Empirical work on choice models, especially on relatively new topics or data sets, often starts with descriptive, or what is colloquially referred to as reduced form, results. Our descriptive form formalizes this process. It is derived from the underlying behavioral model, has an interpretation in terms of fit, and can sometimes be used to quantify biases in agents' expectations. We consider estimators for the descriptive form of discrete choice models with interacting agents that take account...
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作者：Mandler, Michael
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：How robust are economic models to the introduction of irrational agents? The Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibria is not robust since one irrational agent leads to inefficiency. But the property that rational agents cannot use their own resources to Pareto improve on their competitive allocation holds regardless of the number of irrational agents. Full production efficiency can be robust as well, but irrational firms introduce a trade-off between efficiency and the attainment of Pareto ...
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作者：Murto, Pauli; Tervio, Marko
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：We introduce a post-entry liquidity constraint to the standard model of a firm with serially correlated profitability and an irreversible exit decision. We assume that firms with no cash holdings and negative cash flow must either exit or raise new cash at a transaction cost. This creates a precautionary motive for holding cash, which must be traded off against the liquidity cost of holding cash. We characterize the optimal exit and payout policy. The direct effect of financial frictions is to...
