IRRATIONALITY-PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mandler, Michael
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12056
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 443-458
• 关键词: Allocation mechanisms; implementation; INEFFICIENCY; expectations; rationality; rules; smart

摘要

How robust are economic models to the introduction of irrational agents? The Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibria is not robust since one irrational agent leads to inefficiency. But the property that rational agents cannot use their own resources to Pareto improve on their competitive allocation holds regardless of the number of irrational agents. Full production efficiency can be robust as well, but irrational firms introduce a trade-off between efficiency and the attainment of Pareto improvements. Regarding games, I show that while existing implementation mechanisms are sensitive to the presence of irrational agents, there are robust alternatives with attractive welfare properties.