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作者：Merlo, Antonio; Ortalo-Magne, Francois; Rust, John
作者单位：Rice University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Georgetown University
摘要：We formulate and solve the problem of a homeowner who wants to sell her house for the maximum possible price net of transactions costs. We estimate this model using data on transaction histories for 780 residential properties in England. The estimated model fits list price dynamics and other key features of the data. In particular, a tiny menu cost of changing the listing price, as little as ten thousandths of 1% of the house value, is sufficient to explain the high degree of stickiness of lis...
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作者：Bruze, Gustaf
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：A collective marriage matching model is estimated and calibrated to quantify the share of returns to schooling that is realized through marriage. The predictions of the model are matched with detailed Danish household data on the relationship between schooling and wage rates, the division of time and goods within the household, and the extent to which men and women sort positively on several traits in marriage. Counterfactual analysis conducted with the model suggests that Danish men and women...
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作者：Bos, Iwan; Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This article examines endogenous cartel formation in the presence of a competition authority. Competition policy is shown to make the most inclusive stable cartels less inclusive. In particular, small firms that might have been cartel members in the absence of a competition authority are no longer members. Regarding the least inclusive stable cartels, competition policy can either decrease or increase their size and, in the latter case, the collusive price can rise.
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作者：Brinkman, Jeffrey; Coen-Pirani, Daniele; Sieg, Holger
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We develop a new dynamic general equilibrium model to explain firm entry, exit, and relocation decisions in an urban economy with multiple locations and agglomeration externalities. We characterize the stationary distribution of firms that arises in equilibrium. We estimate the parameters of the model using a method of moments estimator. Using unique panel data collected by Dun and Bradstreet, we find that agglomeration externalities increase the productivity of firms by up to 8%. Economic pol...
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作者：Ching, Andrew T.; Hayashi, Fumiko; Wang, Hui
作者单位：University of Toronto; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City; Peking University
摘要：This article develops a new estimation method that accounts for excess demand and the unobserved component of product quality. We apply our method to study the Wisconsin nursing home market in 1999 and find that nearly 20% of elderly qualified for Medicaid were rationed out. However, our counterfactual experiment shows that the net welfare gain of fulfilling all nursing home demands may be small, because the welfare gain could be largely offset by the increase in Medicaid expenditures. We also...
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作者：Kaplan, Greg; Menzio, Guido
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This article is a study of the shape and structure of the distribution of prices at which an identical good is sold in a given market and time period. We find that the typical price distribution is symmetric and leptokurtic, with a standard deviation between 19% and 36%. Only 10% of the variance of prices is due to variation in the expensiveness of the stores at which a good is sold, whereas the remaining 90% is due, in approximately equal parts, to differences in the average price of a good a...
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作者：Hummel, Patrick; Knight, Brian
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Brown University
摘要：Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Simultaneous elections equally weigh states but place too much weight on voter priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front-runners. Simultaneous elections are thus preferred if the front-runner advantage is small, but sequential electio...
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作者：Eisenhauer, Philipp; Heckman, James J.; Mosso, Stefano
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Chicago
摘要：We compare the performance of maximum likelihood (ML) and simulated method of moments (SMM) estimators for dynamic discrete choice models. We construct and estimate a simplified dynamic structural model of education that captures some basic features of educational choices in the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s. We use estimates from our model to simulate a synthetic data set and assess the ability of ML and SMM to recover the model parameters on this sample. We investigate the perfo...
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作者：Mitchell, Matthew; Zhang, Yuzhe
作者单位：University of Toronto; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We study how to reward innovators who build on one another. Rewards come in the form of patents. Because patent rights are scarce, the optimal allocation involves sharing: More than one innovator's patent is in force at a given time. We interpret such allocations as patents that infringe one another as licensing through an ever growing patent pool and as randomization through litigation. We contrast the rate of technological progress under the optimal allocation with the outcome if sharing is ...
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作者：Scharf, Kimberley
作者单位：University of Warwick; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：I describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing where private information affecting collective-value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. I show that unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur...
