PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND INFORMATION DIFFUSION IN SOCIAL GROUPS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Scharf, Kimberley
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12081
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1019-1042
• 关键词: NETWORKS; tax

摘要

I describe a dynamic model of costly information sharing where private information affecting collective-value actions is transmitted by social proximity. Individuals make voluntary contributions toward the provision of a pure public good, and information transmission about quality of provision is a necessary condition for collective provision to take place in a stationary equilibrium. I show that unlike in the case of private goods, better informed individuals face positive incentives to incur a cost to share information with their neighbors and that these incentives are stronger and provision of the pure public good greater the smaller are individuals' social neighborhoods.